Regarding the denunciation of the Contract on RASR

1. Analysis of the problem

2. History of the conclusion of the Contract on RASR (rockets of average and small range)

3. General characteristics of the Contract on RASR, its realization and current state

4. The analysis of motives for the possible denunciation of the Contract on RASR

5. Possible negative consequences for Russia of the denunciation of the Contract on RASR

6. Solution: Global Contract on RASR

1. Analysis of the problem

During the last two years, the Western mass media has engaged in an active disinformation campaign against Russia, alleging that Russia is in violation of the Contract on RASR – this allegation also infringes on the interests of the SRT (Strategic Rocket Troops).

In particular, Russia is accused of alleged violations on the Contract RASR in connection with the test of a prototype of a new Russian IBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) RS-26 "Boundary". Such a charge is made in an article in the Washington Times newspaper (in July, 2013).

As a justification of similar claims, the assumption is made that this rocket represents the rocket of average range. However, its first successful SOA-up with a monoblock head passed from Plesetsk to Kamchatka, which is on an intercontinental range. It is alleged that the SOA-up passed from Kapustin Jar in the district of Balkhash with a multi-charging head piece on the truncated range – a characteristic for rockets of average range.

It should be noted that it is already well-established that the maximum distance is determined by a projection of a trajectory of flight on the terrestrial sphere, from a point of SOA of a rocket of this type to a point of a falling warhead as range of the ballistic missile. Such understanding already developed long ago within the agreements on the SOA (strategic offensive arms). Such knowledge is fixed and in the operating Contract on SOA-2010 (Chapter 1 item 13 “Terms and their definitions” the Protocol to Contract on SOA-2010).

From this point of view, at least one SOA-up of a prototype of the new rocket on range more than 5500 km can unequivocally carry it to a class IBM, and the rocket falls under action CSOA-2010, but as under validity regarding RASR.

Reference. The term «the intercontinental ballistic missile» means a ballistic missile of land basing with a range of over 5500 km (Chapter 1 item 25 “Terms and their definitions” the Protocol to CSOA-2010).

The term "the rocket of average range" means the ballistic missile of land basing or the cruise missile of land basing with a range exceeding 1000 km, yet does not exceed 5500 km (item 5 of the Art. II of the Contract on RASR).

Subsequently the USA was seemingly compelled to admit this fact.

So now, according to the mass media, the report of the Center of the U.S. Air Force on space investigation (Air Force Intelligence Report Provides Snapshot of Nuclear Missiles), argues that the new Russian rocket is tested for intercontinental range, and disproves prior information alleging that Russia broke the Contract RASR. This report was commented on by Hans M. Christensen – the director of nuclear information at the center of the American Federation of Scientists.

So the USA no longer insists that it was a question of violations of the Contract on RASR at IBM RS-26 tests. However, now, the USA speaks about certain Russian land based activity, beyond the Contract on RASR.

On July 29, 2014 the official representative of the White House, Josh Ernest, reported that the U.S. President sent a letter to the President of the Russian Federation notifying him that the USA accuses Russia of violating the Contract on RASR. Nevertheless, the Obama administration did not divulge any information on how Russia allegedly broke this agreement. However, in the letter Obama did express interest in high level negotiations for the purpose of saving the contract. According to mass media reports, Obama later broached the subject in a personal telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin.

On the American allegation that Russia violated the Contract on RASR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation stated that such a charge is totally “unfounded”.

“Once again the USA made an attempt (and again very clumsily) to act as a lone mentor who is somehow in possession of the ultimate truth, grading a subordinate” – as was said in a statement by the foreign policy department of Russia. In other words, American claims are put forward without any evidence; they are based on strange conjectures and unscientifically predetermined conclusions, without any subjection to expert analysis. The probable aim of all this is to burden the countries of the world with disinformation, to saturate the mass media with a kind of “propaganda soup”. Perhaps in the Obama administration, illusion is still strong, and perhaps Washington is really living in its own little world – to paraphrase the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This comment reminds one of the numerous times Russia has had to verbally defend itself against the many slanderous accusations coming out of Washington. In the context of the Contract on RASR, it reminds one to deal with any problems which may arise in an operating mode, without resorting to bombastic or “megaphone diplomacy”.

Nevertheless, unfounded accusations against Russia have spread widely due to the great influence of the mass media.

These charges were willingly accepted by NATO, and the statements of NATO’s Secretary General, Anders Fog Rasmussen, particularly testify to this unfortunate fact.

In one such statement, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that it is “a little at the wrong door”. “If the essence of concern is with the observance of the provisions of this document, it was not necessary to address us, but to one of the member countries of the North Atlantic alliance, being party to the contract”, emphasized the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “If the Secretary General of NATO would seriously like to make a contribution to strengthening the mode of dialogue on the Contract on RASR, we would recommend that NATO should give the contract a multilateral character in favor of what Russia repeatedly enacted”, noted the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “In our opinion, the North Atlantic council should provide a suitable platform where it would be possible to call in, as the first step, allies to consider such a possibility”.

On September 11, 2014 in Moscow, the Russian-American interdepartmental consultations on the subject of the Contract on RASR took place. On the American side was the Deputy US Secretary of State Rose Gettemyuller; the Russian side was represented by Mikhail Ulyanov – the director of the department of non-proliferation and control questions over arms, headed by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The parties discussed their concerns over the implementation of the contract and possible ways to eliminate any problems that should arise.

However, according to Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia did not receive satisfactory answers in connection with the alleged violations of the Contract RASR, purported by Washington.

Mr. Ulyanov confirmed to Moscow that Washington utilizes the cruise missile with a land based range of over 500 km. "Unfortunately, we do not have full clarity concerning what sort of a claim they have against us. It is believed by the Americans that allegedly, some time ago, we carried out a test of the cruise missile, forbidden by the contract, but we don’t have any more information than that", Mr. Ulyanov reported RIA Novosti news agency.

The head of the Center of International Security’s Institute of Mathematics and Economy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Aleksey Arbatov, explained to the Independent Newspaper that there is a question regarding the tests of the cruise missile of the land based R-500.

According to information put out by the mass media, the representative of the American delegation could not provide any evidence of Russian violations on the RASR Contract. According to the American side, it was once again declared that the data available to the USA "is exclusively authentic" and that there cannot be any doubts regarding the data’s objectivity.

Similar views have been expressed by Washington in its ongoing anti-Russian information war in connection with Ukrainian events.

The US State Department has, in turn, voiced its concerns that the performance of the contract was not dispelled by Moscow.

Nevertheless, during consultations, the parties confirmed the importance of saving the Contract on RASR and agreed to continue dialogue, in this or that format, on the elimination of remaining divergences.

The majority of experts consider the untied information surrounding RASR to be related to the general sharpening of Russian-American relations due to the events in Ukraine. It, first of all, has the nature of a psychological threat with the purpose of putting greater pressure on the Russian Federation along with all the sanctions that go with it.

It is therefore possible to assume that there are other motives for the American "charges" against Russia.

It is impossible to exclude that one of the purposes of the American military-political management in this information campaign consists of preventing Russia to create new effective remedies of counteraction to the American AMD global system. Among such new systems is the IBM Boundary weapon, which the Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation Dmitry Rogozin called “the murderer of the AMD”, meaning that it is able to intercept both existing and prospective systems of antimissile defense. Among them is the operational and tactical Iskander complex which, in the November 23, 2011 statement of the Russian President Vladimir Putin, was designated as a means of defeating the AMD system in Poland, from the missile complex in the Kaliningrad region.

The attempt by Washington to remove criticism from its own numerous and real violations of the agreement can be one more reason why the Americans are hurling allegations against Russia concerning its imaginary "violations" of the Contract on RASR.

In the Russian experts’ opinion there was also one more point of view: the American charges against Russia (on the violation of the Contract on RASR) are urged to create preconditions for a unilateral exit of the USA from the Contract on RASR and the expansion of rockets of average range to our borders.

The idea of an exit of the USA from the Contract on RASR is discussed and in the Western mass media. For example, according to RIA Novosti news agency, “The contract on rockets of average and small range became outdated even before violations from Russia” <http://inosmi.ru/world/20140911/222917615.html> ("The Wall Street Jouranal", 9/11/2014). Here the author urges the USA to leave the Contract on RASR and to update the arsenal so that it corresponds to the global responsibility of the country.

In this context there are solutions from the last summit of NATO in September, 2014 (held in Newport), regarding the strengthening of the eastern flank of the alliance, which is to say the strengthening of the military presence of the alliance near the borders of Russia. In the same context are the proposals of some Western politicians which dismiss NATO’s ratified treaty obligations not to place groups of armed forces and nuclear weapons on the territory of new NATO member states according to the Fundamental Act of 1997.

Meanwhile the expediency of the Contract on RASR of 1987 which was concluded on a termless basis, was called into question repeatedly. The question of the denunciation of the Contract of RASR has already been discussed periodically in the mass media, and among experts and politicians. For example, this question was actively discussed in Russia in connection with the first wave of the expansion of NATO – NATO operations against Yugoslavia, an exit of the USA from the Contract on the AMD, plans for the expansion of the third item region of the AMD of the USA in Europe. And for the denunciation of the Contract on RASR a number of high-ranking Russian state and military figures expressed their views.

In 2005 the influential British newspaper “Financial Times” published an article referring to sources in the American administration, which affirmed that during a visit to the USA the Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov discussed with US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld the possibility of an exit of Russia from the Contract on RASR. Thus according to the newspaper version, the Russian offer on a withdrawal from a treaty on RASR did not cause objections from the USA. This article caused polemic in mass media, and from official circles denials followed. In particular, according to the statement of the head of the press service of the military department of the USA, “The United States is the country which has signed the contract, against its cancellation or an exit from other countries”. And Alexander Yakovenko, the official representative of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, spoke of the “commitment of Russia to the Contract on RASR”.

In 2006, the chief of the 4th central research institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Major General V. Vasilenko, answered the questions of "Interfax" stating that “the expansion of land rockets of average range is one of the ways in which to ensure the principle of national security”. Thus he was attentive in his statement, making sure he did not contradict the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. By considering the question of the expansion of rockets of average range it will be necessary to carry out the all-around military-economic analysis.

According to information put out by the mass media in 2006, during the next meeting of the Russian Ministers of Defense and the USA – in reply to D. Rumsfeld’s initiative on usual warheads for the fight against terrorist threats – S. Ivanov brought the counter offer on the re-equipment of a part of intercontinental ballistic missiles, to use rockets of average range against the terrorists.

On February 10, 2007 the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, in his well-known speech on safety policy issues in Munich pointed out that a number of third world countries have created rockets of average range, and yet the USA forbids Russia to have systems of this class under the Contract on RASR.

Then in Munich the Minister of Defense of Russia S. Ivanov, in conversation with journalists, called the Contract on RASR a "relic of the Cold War".

In 2007 the possibility of an exit of Russia from the Contract on RASR, in reply to plans of the expansion of the third item region of the AMD of the USA in Europe, was declared by the chief of the General Staff of VS Russian Federation Yu. Baluyevsky.

The commander of RVSN N. Solovtsov, making comments on this subject, noted that RVSN are ready to any development of a situation. "If the political decision on an exit from this contract is made, RST will be ready to solve this problem",  Solovtsov said.

The Head of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S. Lavrov, commented on the statement of the high-ranking military official, declaring that it does not mean the acceptance of a final decision. "In this case it is not a question of any already accepted decision. We are simply ascertaining the situation".

On October 25, 2007 within the 62nd session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Joint Russian-American statement under the Contract on RASR was sounded. In this statement, the Russian Federation and the USA urged each other to discuss the possibility of giving a global character to the RASR mode by refusing other countries the right to have rockets with ranges of 500-5500 km, and to carry out the destruction of any such rockets and the termination of the related programs.

This subject was mentioned also by the President of the Russian Federation V. Putin. "It is necessary to give the contract a global character. If we cannot reach this purpose, it will be difficult for us to remain within this agreement when other states actively develop such systems of arms, including the states which are in close proximity to our borders", the President declared. These words were interpreted in the mass media as the prevention of a possible exit of Russia from the Contract on RASR.

In 2013, at a meeting with representatives of the Military Industrial Complex, the Russian President V. Putin noted that Gorbachev's decision to sign the Contract on RASR was "at least disputable", though he added that Russia will observe this document.

In 2013-2014 S. Ivanov, already the acting Chief of the Russian Presidential Administration, also criticized the Contract on RASR. In particular, he declared that the Contract on RASR was disputable, and that it cannot observe it indefinitely.

Nevertheless, in September 2014, at a consultation on RASR, it was noted that “Russia does not intend to leave the Contract with the USA on rockets of average and smaller range if Russia does not determine that interests of its safety are under the threat”. “In principle, in exceptional cases, each of the parties can leave the contract. I emphasize that these would be exceptional cases, yet I do not foresee them to arise», declared S. Ivanov <http://agregator.pro/key/%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2> in an interview with “The Russian” newspaper».

“I am still convinced that the Contract on RASR - the contract harmful to us, - was declared in the summer of 2014 to the ‘Independent Newspaper’ by general Yuri Baluyevsky.  If it should exit, Russia will have more pluses than minuses. Now, when the placement of elements of the American AMD system in Eastern Europe passed to a practical phase and our relations with the USA and NATO worsen even more because of events in Ukraine, the question of denunciation of the Contract of RASR sounds even more realistic”, he says.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also officially and constantly emphasized  Russia’s commitment to the Contract on RASR.

Many supporters consider that the withdrawal from a treaty about RASR will not give any advantages in respect of strengthening the safety of the Russian Federation, and they point to a number of negative consequences of such a decision. The interesting point of view was stated by the former chief of 4 central research institutes of the Russian Ministry of Defense –  Major General V. Dvorkin. He considers that to leave the Contract on RASR is not meaningful, as rockets of average range are actually manufactured by us, meaning the IBM RS-26 "Boundary".

However, among experts, there is a lot of supporter for the denunciation of the Contract on RASR.

Besides, in the expert environment the idea of change of the Contract on RASR is expressed. For example, the option of adapting the contract, allowing to have a limited number of land rockets of average and smaller range.

Among experts, the idea of new negotiations on RASR was also expressed, for the purpose of the United States’ and NATO’s recognition of the special value for the Russian Federation of missile systems of regional range and the special rights of Russia to maintain its arsenal.

Thus, periodic discussion of a question of denunciation of the Contract on RASR testifies to the existence or possible official statement of this question. In these materials, a preliminary study of the question of possible denunciation of the Contract on RASR is carried out.

2. History of the conclusion of the Contract on RASR

As the Contract of one of RASR is estimated to be "disputable", it is rather interesting to analyze the motives and history of its conclusion.

Since the end of the 1970s the situation has not been easy in the relations between the USSR and NATO on the European continent. The United States did not take into account the Soviet-American strategic balance of the advanced basing and nuclear means of the European allies in NATO, like Great Britain and France.

Under these conditions the Soviet Union began expansion, during the end of the 1970s, in the European part of the territory of the USSR of new mobile soil RK with the rocket of average range RAR-10 "Pioneer". These rockets replaced out-of-date stationary rockets of average range R-12 and R-14.

On a number of delivery systems of the nuclear weapons of average range (the rocket of average range, aircraft, including deck) NATO was surpassed by the USSR almost twice (~ 1800:1000). At the same time, the USSR had more rockets of average range. Great Britain and France had 178, and the USSR had approximately 600, from which about 500 were stationed in the European part of the country.

In reply to the RAR "Pioneer" expansion in December 1979, NATO decided to expand the number of new American rockets of average range of land basing – 108 Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and 464 BGM-109G Tomahawk cruise missiles – on the territory of a number of European states.

It should be noted that the Soviet RAR "Pioneer" in Europe could not reach the territory of the USA in any way. And the American RAR in Europe could strike blows deep into the Soviet territory: Pershing-2 systems range to 1800 km reached the Moscow region, and KRNB range to 2500 km - almost to the Urals. This created the threat of delivering a "decapitating" blow on the command points at the top management of SNF (strategic nuclear forces) and state bodies. The small fly time of RAR "Pershing-2" to Moscow (10-12 minutes) left a minimum of time for making a decision to retaliate.

Fears of the Soviet management were reasonable also because of the technological innovations used in the American rockets - they were equipped rather precisely to get deep into charges with a switched trotyl equivalent and were capable to strike the protected objects.

Owing to the specified geostrategic asymmetry of the USSR it was interested in the non-stationing of the American rockets in the European region. The danger of further expansion of nuclear missile exchange in Europe also pressed dialogue.

In these conditions between the USSR and the USA, since the autumn of 1980, the problem of European nuclear weapons led SOAed to be discussed. Nuclear missiles of land basing of average range and planes - nuclear delivery vehicles of average radius of action became a subject of these negotiations.

However the difficult situation at negotiations of 1980-1983 and surrounding them did not allow the parties to reach results, and negotiations were interrupted.

Nevertheless, during these negotiations the Soviet Union put forward some various versions of the solution of the European nuclear problem:

- in 1980 the USSR suggested to enter the moratorium on the placement in Europe of new average range missiles by NATO and the USSR, i.e. to "freeze" the existing level of such means;

- in 1981 the USSR suggested to reduce average range missiles in Europe to the level of 300 units for each of the parties;

- in 1982 the USSR suggested to establish an equal number in Europe of both the number of RAR and planes (i.e. the European region of the USSR should still have as many rockets as England and France);

- in 1983 the USSR expressed its readiness to have in Europe no more than 140 RAR rockets, i.e. less than was available for France and Great Britain. At the same time, the USA should refuse placement of the RAR in Europe. The offer provided also equal caps for the parties on planes - nuclear delivery vehicles of average radius of action.

The USA did not accept any of these offers.

In 1982 the Soviet Union unilaterally entered the moratorium on the expansion of the nuclear weapons of average range - before the achievement of the agreement from the USA on such arms or prior to the beginning of the expansion of the American RAR in Europe. To this the USSR declared its intention in 1982 to reduce a quantity of the RAR. This initiative of the USSR also went unanswered by the Americans.

From the USA the following offers were brought:

- in 1981 the USA offered the so-called "zero" option providing refusal of the USA from placement of RAR in Europe in exchange for the elimination of all Soviet rockets of average range (both in European, and in the Asian part of the USSR). That is, it was offered to liquidate the really developed group of 600 Soviet rockets in exchange for the refusal of the USA of the plan on expansion of rockets which then was in its developing stage;

- in March 1983 the USA proposed the "intermediate" option providing an equal quantity of RAR for the USSR and the USA, but the RAR of France and Great Britain, and also aircraft restrictions were not covered;

- in November 1983 the USA suggested to establish equal limits on the number of the USSR’s and USA’s warheads in the amount of 420 units each.

In November 1983 the USA nevertheless began the expansion of the RAR in Europe. The Soviet party left negotiations, during which even the circle of discussed questions remained uncoordinated.

As a countermeasure, the USSR declared the cancellation of the moratorium on the expansion of rockets of average range in the European part of the country and the placement in Czechoslovakia and GDR of operational and tactical rockets of the increased range of "Temp-S" (Yu.V.Antropov's Statement from November 24, 1983 about refusal of the USSR of negotiations on restriction and reduction of strategic arms in Europe and intention to place in the countries of the Warsaw pact new medium-range missiles).

According to available open data, the decision on the development of new mobile RK of average range for placement in the territory of GDR and Czechoslovakia was also made "Speed". It was planned to relocate also a part of the RC "Pioneer" to Chukotka from which territory they could block on range some areas of the northwestern region of the USA, for example Alaska.

The Soviet government supposed that such measures would compel Washington to reduce the RAR from Europe in exchange for a conclusion of the Soviet Speed rockets from GDR and Czechoslovakia and Pioneer rockets from Chukotka. The group of Pioneer rockets in the European part of the territory of the USSR would thus remain.

However in 1985, Gorbachev came to power in the USSR. This change in leadership was marked by the most radical and rapid change in the USSR’s approach to questions of military construction, disarmament and an intensification of negotiations on the restriction of the SOA.

Approaches to the solution of the problem of the American rockets of the advanced basing also changed. In April 1985 the USSR unilaterally suspended the countermeasures which it SOAed after the beginning of the expansion of the American RAR in Europe.

In Western Europe there were waves of anti-war demonstrations in which various sectors of society took part while the SOAed overflowed – this included political, trade-union, religious, and scientific figures who advocated for the elimination of US military bases in Europe. The anti-war movement was supported by the Soviet Union, which developed a powerful promotional campaign addressed to European public opinion. Against this backdrop, under conditions of serious nuclear confrontation, the need for a resumption of negotiations became more and more obvious.

Negotiations renewed in 1985, more than a year after a break.

In October 1986 a meeting took place in Reykjavík between M. Gorbachev and U.S. President R. Reagan. This meeting ended dramatically – it did not give the results on which the Soviet party counted. At the same time, the Soviets created a qualitatively new situation, and designed a change in negotiations.

In November 1986, at negotiations in Geneva, the Soviet delegation put forward a package of proposals on the basis of what were discussed at the summit in Reykjavík. The USSR suggested to liquidate all Soviet and American RAR in Europe preserved in the Asian part of the USSR and in the territory of the USA – up to100 warheads of such rockets. At this USSR would have 33 Pioneer rockets with DHP (divided head part) in an Asian part of the country, and the USA - 100 monoblock Pershing-2 rockets in the territory of the country. At the same time the Soviet party suggested to establish equal levels on operational and tactical rockets of the USSR and the USA under condition of a ban on their expansion in Europe. At this, the USSR refused the accounting of rockets of Great Britain and France, the decision on aviation nuclear means of average range was postponed.

In April 1987, while in Moscow, US Secretary of State Schultz said in a meeting with Gorbachev that the US was ready to adhere in principle to the option discussed at negotiations in Geneva.

Nevertheless, as a result of an even more radical option of restrictions, the so-called “double global zero” was finally coordinated, providing for the elimination of not only all American and Soviet rockets of average range (over 1000 to 5500 km), but also of all rockets of smaller range (from 500 to 1000 km). This option also was legally fixed by the Contract on RASR.

Results of negotiations on RASR cause an ambiguous assessment now in the expert environment.

In widespread opinion, on the last phase of negotiations on RASR (at the time of Gorbachev) the USSR made unjustified concessions to Washington.

There appeared at this time statements of universal values coming from high-ranking Communist party officials within the Soviet government which disturbed negotiations on disarmament and went against the national interests of the country. It was proclaimed that “solutions of a military and technical order cannot compensate deficiency of political will in the aspiration of mankind to leave a vicious circle of escalation of military efforts”. Such installations, certainly, were negatively reflected in the points of view of interests of the state.

As a result of the conclusion of the Contract on RASR the Soviet Union was compelled to liquidate twice as many rockets than the USA (respectively 1846 and 846).

The obligation of the Soviet Union to liquidate within the Contract on RASR the latest operational and tactical Oka OTR-23 rockets was exposed to serious criticism. These rockets had a range of less than 500 km and did not fall under validity. The decision on obligations on the elimination of OTR-23 was accepted by the highest political leaders in the country, despite all the objections of military experts, and represented a political step to urge support for the agreement.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to recognize that for the Soviet Union it was extremely interested in a conclusion from Europe of the American RAR representing for our country an element of strategic nuclear threat. It became a motive of the conclusion for the USSR Contracts on RASR and the main result of its realization.

The contract on RASR became the first ever international treaty in the field of real nuclear disarmament. As a result of its performance rockets with a range from 500 to 5500 km were completely excluded from US and Soviet nuclear arsenals.

The elimination of rockets of average and smaller range essentially lowered level of military opposition – it was an important element of normalization of a military-political situation in Europe and in the world as a whole. Positive practical results of implementation of the Contract on RASR expedited the negotiation process in the sphere of restriction of strategic nuclear weapons and in other directions of disarmament, and during the implementation of the Contract on RASR there was a reflection of the relevant subsequent agreements.

3. General characteristic of the Contract on RASR and the current state of its realization

The contract between the USSR and the USA about the elimination of their rockets of average range and smaller range (“The contract on RASR”) was signed on December 8, 1987 and came into force on June 1, 1988.

According to the Contract on RASR of the party undertook to liquidate within the first three years of its action ballistic and cruise missiles of land basing of average (from 1000 to 5500 km) and smaller (from 500 km to 1000 km) and further not to make and not to test such rockets. Together with rockets of elimination their launchers, the related auxiliary constructions and auxiliaries, areas of expansion, rocket operational bases and rocket auxiliary objects were subject.

Subject eliminations the Soviet rockets of average range were developed in the territory of nine republics of the USSR - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, Estonia, and also in the territory of GDR and Czechoslovak socialist republic. The American rockets were developed in the territory of the European countries of NATO - Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Germany.

As a result of implementation of the contract by June 1, 1991 of the USSR liquidated 1846 rockets, including 889 rockets of average range (654 RAR-10, 149 R-12, 6 R-14, 80 RK-55 cruise missiles) and 957 rockets of smaller range (718 OTR-22 and 239 OTR-23).

The USA liquidated 846 rockets, including 677 rockets of average range (234 "Pershing-2" and 443 BGM-109G Tomahawk cruise missiles) and 169 rockets of smaller range of "Pershing-1A".

Among liquidated were not only out-of-date, but also new, just developed or not fulfilled the term of the rocket. So, from the USA about 680 such rockets (by "Pershing-2" and BGM-109G) were destroyed, from the USSR - about 950 similar rockets (RAR-10, RK-55 and OTR-23).

The contract on RASR provided unprecedented depth and coverage of the control mechanism. For the first time in practice of nuclear disarmament inspection activity received legal registration.

With a view of control over the implementation of the contract of the party had the right to lead within 13 years from the moment of the introduction it owing to inspection both within the territory of other party, and within territories of the countries of placement. The contract provided inspections on a constant basis on objects on production of rockets on Votkinsk machine building plant in the USSR and Gerkules plant (of Magn, by piece Utah) in the USA.

For years of validity on the objects which are subject to control, 442 inspections were carried out from the USSR (Russia) and 774 inspections - from the USA. The total number of the experts involved in inspection work on the Contract on RASR, made about seven thousand people from the USSR (Russia) and thirteen thousand - from the USA.

Due to the end on May 31, 2001 inspection activities for the Contract on RASR now control of its observance is carried out only with use of national means of control and by an exchange of notices.

Implementation of the Contract on RASR demanded creation of the special organizational structures which did not have analogues earlier. In the USSR it was created NCCNW - the national centre for reduction of nuclear danger to which exchange of information under the Contract on RASR, and in the subsequent and under other contracts was assigned. In types of Armed forces of the USSR divisions for the solution of problems of elimination of arms and ensuring inspections of the USA on objects of MD USSR - the Control centers of elimination transformed further to the Centers of ensuring of implementation of contracts were also created.

For assistance to implementation of the Contract on RASR the Special control commission, which promoted permission of the questions relating to implementation of accepted obligations and coordination of measures, viability necessary for increase and efficiency of the contract was created. During work of the commission necessary inspection procedures were developed, questions of a legal and material order were solved, the system of mutual financial calculations was fulfilled. The important direction of work of the commission was consideration of questions of observance of provisions of the contract.

29 sessions of this commission took place, the last in October 2003, since then the commission was not convened.

It is necessary to pay special attention to a question of assignment under the Contract on RASR in communication by the termination of existence of the USSR as the subject of international law and emergence in its territory of fifteen new states.

The United States defined its position after disintegration of the USSR according to which all states formed in its territory should become assignees of the USSR concerning the Contract on RASR. An exception of the USA made only for the Baltic States in spite of the fact that a significant amount of the objects which are subject to inspectorates for the Contract on RASR, was available and in the territory of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In 1993 the American side made the official statement that she will not carry out inspection in the territory of these countries and does not consider them as assignees of the USSR.

In 1992 the Decision on participation of the participating states of the CIS in the Contract on RASR was signed. The decision was signed by Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Ukraine.

According to this solution of the state of the CIS undertook to carry out provisions of the Contract on RASR with reference to their territory and taking into account their national interests, and to take necessary measures for registration with the assistance of the USA the corresponding arrangement on assignment. However such arrangement it was not signed, that is de jure assignees of the USSR are not determined by the Contract on RASR so far.

From a practical side of business (ensuring inspection activity, participation in work of Special control commission) de facto as the states assignees of the USSR under the Contract on RASR acted Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

The contract on RASR is termless, however each of the parties in a procedure of the state sovereignty has the right to leave it if will decide that the contracts connected with the contents exceptional circumstances threatened its highest interests. In this case the party, decided to leave the contract, in six months prior to an exit notifies other parties of the contract on such decision. The represented notice contains the statement for exceptional circumstances which the notifying party considers as the highest interests which have threatened it.

To be continued...