Battle For Taiwan

How the U.S. plans to defend its “unsinkable aircraft carrier”

Relations between the U.S. and China have recently deteriorated significantly. Diplomatic rhetoric has escalated. Politicians in Washington are calling for tough measures. Military analysts and experts predict various conflict scenarios. Most of them will allegedly occur because of China’s decision to incorporate Taiwan by force into its political system.

However, it should be noted that despite the fact that China has been on the list of the main threats to the United States since the era of the Donald Trump administration, the development of military solutions against China began much earlier. Under Barack Obama, when Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski were actively campaigned for friendship with the Middle Kingdom under the guise of the G-2 or Chimerica, the Pentagon was already working on options for war against China.

Strategies for active containment of China

The oldest and most specific concept for waging war against China is called the Air-Sea Battle. It was introduced by the U.S. Department of Defense more than a decade ago and was based on previous similar doctrines justifying air superiority. For example, as far back as 1992, NATO Allied Commander Admiral James Stavridis pointed out the importance of creating combined air and other force strength to ensure victory.

This concept is based on the earler doctrine of “Air-Land Battle”, developed for the European theater of military operations in the 70’s – 80’s to counter the Soviet Union by NATO forces. It is based on deep attacks, but unlike the Cold War concept, Air-Sea Battle describes comprehensive operations in all five spheres (air, land, sea, space and cyberspace) to create an advantage. It also aims to protect one’s rear in the same areas.

In late 2011, the U.S. Secretary of Defense approved the Air-Sea Battle concept as a necessary step in the reform of the U.S. armed forces, for which a special department was established. The introduction of this concept as official doctrine enabled the start of criticism of some provisions to bring it to perfection. Some authors, in particular, suggested that military planning against China should be conducted with a view to contemporary Chinese society, where there are various internal problems: ethnic diversity (more than 50 minorities, among which Uighurs, Tibetans and Mongols have recently shown themselves not very friendly to the political center), trends of regional separatism, imbalance in economic development, especially between coastal and inland regions. That is, the emphasis has already been on China’s internal destabilization as well.

Since 2013, it has been constantly upgraded, which was criticized by Beijing.

At about the same time, an Offshore Control strategy was also under active development. It is based on the use of available means and limited ways to deprive China of the use of the sea inside the first island chain and protect its sea and air space of the first island chain. This establishes its own dominance in the air and sea space outside the island chain. No operations to penetrate into Chinese airspace were to be performed. The prohibition of these actions was interpreted as the need to reduce the possibility of nuclear escalation, as well as to facilitate the initiation of negotiations and the termination of the war. Instead of escalation, this strategy uses economic strangulation to deplete China to the point where it itself would seek to end the war as quickly as possible.

The “prohibition” element of this campaign creates a maritime exclusion zone within the first island chain. The United States will use its dominant submarine force, mines, and limited air assets to secure the zone by sinking incoming ships.

The “defense” element will engage the full range of U.S. military assets to protect those allies who choose to actively assist the United States. The surface fleet and air assets would be away from the Chinese mainland, forcing China to fight at greater distances, allowing U.S. and allied forces to strike as part of an integrated air-sea defense of their own territories.

The “dominance” campaign would be conducted beyond the reach of most Chinese assets by prohibiting shipping in the straits along the Indonesian island chain and the west coast of the Americas. The campaign involves using a combination of air, sea, land and leased commercial platforms to intercept and divert supertankers and container ships needed for China’s economy.

These two strategies are basic to U.S. approaches to warfare against China, which are being adapted as conditions have changed.

Possible future scenarios

To understand the course of thought of the U.S. military, it is interesting to turn to a recent collective paper entitled “Crossing the Strait: China’s Military Prepares for War with Taiwan”, published by the U.S. National Defense University. In it, a number of authors describe the PLA’s modernization that “while the prospects for peaceful unification are narrowing, China’s menu of military intimidation and warfare options is expanding. Peacetime gun rattling, which is most useful in dissuading Taiwan from pursuing de jure independence, has become more routine and varied”.

They believe that Taiwan will be Beijing’s goal as a long-term priority, but specific short-term goals will fluctuate according to changing conditions. The PRC’s calculus with regard to forcing the island will be determined by how Beijing weighs costs, benefits, and risks against specific short-term goals. These estimates will change accordingly over the coming decades, depending on the PRC’s future trajectory.

The authors suggest two main options for a solution, such as:

– a concerted effort to improve Taiwan’s defense capabilities and focus them on increasing the costs and risks associated with the PRC’s military options. These efforts should focus on specific actions to improve military capabilities rather than symbolic measures of U.S. support for Taiwan.

– influence on the CCP leadership to support the possibility of peaceful unification.

The paradox is that China itself is interested in peaceful unification. However, Washington can hardly be trusted that this process is in line with their goal. Otherwise they would not provoke China and continue the militarization of Taiwan and the countries of the region.

When it comes to military strategies, the U.S. is considering several options for China’s actions against Taiwan:

– applying containment;

– gradually establishing a position of military superiority;

– extending China’s administrative control inside Taiwan’s air defense and possibly over some of Taiwan’s outlying islands;

– securing domestic political gains;

– testing U.S. resolve.

Assuming that the PLA will use the full range of capabilities, from missile/air strikes, naval blockade and amphibious assaults to information operations and cyber attacks, the U.S. is accordingly thinking about a possible adequate response.

Semi-partisan warfare in an urban environment

The U.S. military is paying special attention to so-called urban warfare, as China has its own synonym for it – Chengshi Zozozhan (城市作战). This method is also referred to by Chinese military leaders as nothing other than “beating mice in a china store” (瓷器店里打老鼠), that is, performing something that is very difficult that could have serious consequences, so one must be very careful.

Having carefully studied the relevant PLA doctrinal texts on urban warfare, American experts have concluded that there are certain hierarchical meanings that tie into a systemic understanding of urban warfare. The experience of the U.S. armed forces in Iraq and Syria was studied.

As a response to urban warfare in China, the U.S. proposes rethinking the degree to which the island’s military and civilian population are prepared for national defense. They put forward the so-called Conformal military design, a concept of integrating the functionality of sensors and weapons into the natural contours of warships and aircraft, which could be extended to urban landscape design.

The experience of U.S. anti-terrorist units, which are stationed around the Capitol in Washington, could be used for this purpose.

Another suggestion is to use conventional munitions and commercial technology. As coalition forces in Iraq from 2004 to 2011 demonstrated, conventional military munitions dispersed in the early days of the conflict, combined with modern retail electronics and ingenuity, helped the Iraqi resistance mount a deadly and effective campaign against the United States and its allies. Improvised explosive devices were used to attack coalition vehicles and stage ambushes. Accordingly, motorcycle and scooter repair shops on the streets of Taipei could quickly be repurposed for military use.

It is likely that the U.S. is already training instructors in Taiwan to conduct insurgency operations. At least such methods are consistent with the Special Warfare of the U.S. Special Operations Forces. And Taiwan is part of the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility of U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCPAC).

Also, U.S. military experts recommend proper reconnaissance to identify units that could potentially be used to take over China. Particular attention should be paid to landing groups and whether they include special forces for urban warfare. This will help predict whether operations on the island will be protracted, preventing a quick recognition of PRC sovereignty over Taiwan.

The U.S. also keeps a close eye on China’s mobilization and logistical capabilities, believing them to be quite effective. In this regard, the Taiwanese military is advised to promote several countermeasures at once. First, it is to improve the ability to transition from peacetime to wartime operations. Second, it is strengthening intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities, thereby expanding the time gap for early warning by obtaining vital information on PLA material and transport mobilization. Third is the integration of long-range precision-guided strike weapon systems to enhance Taiwan’s “unified suppression warfare” (lianhe zhia zuojian, 联合制压作战) capabilities, based on the overall defense concept.

These strike systems should be combined with cyber and information warfare to launch attacks on PLA logistical mobilization nodes to disrupt its battle rhythm and seize strategic space and time. These measures could exploit existing deficiencies in PLA logistical support and mobilization. The Americans believe that if the PLA wants a quick victory in the invasion of Taiwan, it must rely on the smooth operation of its logistical support and mobilization plan. Consequently, it will be critical for the Taiwanese military to sabotage the PLA’s logistics and mobilization systems at the start of the war. Or perhaps in the preparation phase, which would include sabotage of Chinese territory and cyber attacks.

Overall defense concept

In 2017, then-Taiwan’s chief of general staff, Admiral Li Ximin, proposed a new approach to Taiwan’s defense, called the Overall Defense Concept.

It is essentially an asymmetric strategy that uses mobility, camouflage, swarming tactics, and innovative approaches to complicate the PLA’s ability to find and destroy Taiwanese platforms (targets), especially in the early stages of the conflict. Like all such concepts, it is based on maximizing the advantage of defense and aims to defeat the enemy at the moment of vulnerability, namely, when it is in the coastal zone. Thus, the first phase of military action under the Overall Defense Concept consists of maintaining one’s own armed forces during the PLA’s initial attack on the island and its blockade. Taiwan’s armed forces must represent a large number of small mobile units that can leave bases, conceal their positions and make it difficult for them to be detected. Then there comes the decisive battle in the coastal zone, which stretches for a hundred kilometers. The key elements for it are minefields and anti-ship cruise missiles. Underwater drones, aircraft or ships can be used to create minefields around the island. U.S. military experts call this part of the “porcupine strategy”. Taiwan has already asked the United States for air-delivered Quickstrike MK-64 sea mines to resupply it and enable rapid deployment at the start of a conflict. Taiwan also has World War II-era MK-6 mines that it bought from the United States and periodically tests their reliability. Also, the Chung Shan National Defense Company has been producing mines since 2002.

As for missiles, Taiwan currently has truck-mounted Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles that can be hidden in a secluded place to avoid initial strikes and then attack them when PLA ships start crossing the Strait. In order to avoid retaliatory strikes, they must immediately change location.

The third phase of the Overall Defense Concept aims to destroy the enemy in the “beach zone”, which extends about 40 kilometers from the proposed landing sites. In this phase, Taiwan’s navy must lay mines both in deep water and in shallow water near possible landing zones. A new fleet of automated high-speed mine-laying ships is already under construction for this mission, with the first vessel of this class launched in August 2020. Mine-dumping guides could be installed on several classes of surface ships. It is also known that they will be included in the design of corvettes that are expected to enter the Taiwanese Army. Because of the minefields, the first invasion ships will be forced to slow down and then swarms of small fast attack boats and anti-ship cruise missiles launched from trucks will strike them. In particular, it is important to hit key PLA ships, especially amphibious assault ships carrying manpower (marines) and rapid reaction ships carrying vehicles and armored vehicles.

To succeed in this campaign, Taiwan must have a significant ammunition stockpile, as relying on supplies from allies during the conflict will be difficult because of the possible PLA blockade of the island. It is also necessary to have a sufficient number of personnel. This is probably the reason why Taiwan decided late last year to increase the period of compulsory military service to one year. The military service will be compulsory since January 1, 2024.

At the moment, the main unresolved problem for implementing this model is Taiwan’s stagnant defense budget, which is unable to maintain sufficient investment in both asymmetric coastal defense and conventional long-range strike capabilities.

Ukrainian experience and broader approaches

U.S. experts also note the role of UAVs in the conflict in Ukraine, suggesting that such assets would be heavily used in a potential war in Taiwan. They believe that a combination of Air Force capabilities is needed, where crewed aircraft and drones will be used that can reach the range of Chinese weapon systems to destroy them quickly. Only unlike those used in Ukraine, U.S. Air Force UAVs will need greater range, survivability, autonomy, and sophisticated sensors and payloads to use real coercive leverage.

This requires balancing the creation of a large number of low-cost drones with the strategic and operational requirements facing the U.S. Air Force in the Indo-Pacific region.

Finally, there is a general understanding in the U.S. that China will use a combined strategy with respect to Taiwan, which falls under the gray zone concept. Therefore, opposition to Beijing cannot be conducted exclusively by political or military means.

In this regard, experts of the American Enterprise Institute suggest that the U.S. take advantage of China’s vulnerabilities in four areas.

Economic: sharp reduction of U.S. dependence on China and the search for alternative markets;

Diplomatic: countering China’s enforcement actions by strengthening alliances;

Military: stabilizing the military balance in Asia through investment in critical defense capabilities. To undermine China’s efforts to pressure the Taiwanese government and deter the Chinese Communist Party from attacking Taiwan;

Democratic: countering the erosion of human rights by China with the help of friends in Qingjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong and elsewhere.

Here we see a new development of the “Air-Sea Battle” strategy. Therefore, it is necessary to keep an eye not only on Taiwan’s military-industrial complex, U.S. arms deliveries and Taipei’s ongoing reforms, but also on other dimensions that can be used to apply hybrid warfare tools against China.

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