Towards a multipolar world: Lessons for Taiwan

13.04.2022

The Soviet disintegration in 1991 prompted political pundits to dub the international political outlook of the time as the “unipolar moment” and the “End of History”. It was considered as triumph of democracy and capitalism over Communism at the global stage, and America’s coronation as the sole super power. The so-called threat to European security, USSR had been neutralized.

At the onset of the Cold War, under the aegis of United States the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949. NATO's (United States gets to dictate the direction as it contributes the most funds, weapons and personnel) creation was designed to limit Soviet influence and create a military alliance in Europe that could offset Soviet aggression.

Post-cold war, the question of NATO’s utility arose. Instead of scaling back political and military ambitions the alliance continued to grow and bring in more countries (7 countries joined in 2004). Despite the threat from erstwhile USSR greatly diminished after 1991, the West continued to posture aggressively in Europe and export advanced weapon systems to Eastern European states, which Russia opposed. The evolving situation was not only concerning to the Russians but also European and American bureaucrats were quick to point out the flaws in expansion of NATO membership. They warned that Russia would consider it an act of aggression and an attempt to limit its external space. This could trigger strong reactions even military response in Eastern Europe.

It is noteworthy, since Soviet disintegration and now, American global reach and influence has receded with its domestic public arguing in favor of lesser American involvements abroad. Instead, Russian and Chinese influence and diplomacy has gained traction. The west has reached the point of being overstretched. The shifting tectonic plates of global order have ushered in a multipolar world with strong regional political leanings.

Ukraine: The tipping point

Ukraine and NATO’s engagement started in 2008 with the former applying to integrate with NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP). This action created a security concern for Russia. Time and again, Russia stated that Ukraine is the red line which if crossed would seriously undermine Russian security prompting it to act. The situation worsened when in 2021, NATO leader emphasized the declaration made in 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO’s fold. Russia had to act.

The “special military operation” in Ukraine is limited in nature and Russia has not thrown in its full weight in the fight, yet. However, what is interesting to note is the West’s complete inability to a) politically deescalate or limit the conflict and b) utter helplessness in assisting Ukraine overcome the crisis. Slapping sanctions on Russia and military support to Ukraine is not going to settle the matter, but just delay the inevitable.

Consequently, Ukraine’s President Zelensky has said that Ukraine would not be joining NATO anytime soon. More recently Zelensky has lashed out on Germany and France, ‘blaming them for the current war and suggesting their 2008 stance against admitting Kyiv to NATO was a clear "miscalculation"’. NATO has just asked President Putin to withdraw from Ukraine, as warning that has had no effect.

President Biden faces backlash at home for miscalculating Russian response, European energy dependence on Russia and lack of military options. The crisis has initiated concerns around use of nuclear weapons, that has left the west out of options.

Promises of security to Taiwan

On a different continent, the United States of America has given security guarantees to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan. Currently, in Japan the US has more than 55,000 troops stationed in multiple bases under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. In South Korea, 30,000 US troops are stationed since the end of the Korean war as a deterrent against North Korea.

The situation of Taiwan is more concerning. With no US troops on the ground and a super power just across the strait, Taiwan finds itself very dependent over American security guarantees and weapons. In 1979, the US during President Carter’s rule, resolved to improve its relations with China and affirmed in a joint communiqué, that “the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China” and ended diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. To make matters worse and keep Taiwan as a bargaining chip the US under its Taiwan Relations Act, approved by US Congress, would have to regard any military attack on Taiwan by China as a matter of "grave concern" to the US and consequently supply Taiwan with weapons, it needs for its self-defense.

But the complicating factor is that the U.S. not only wants to reiterate security for Taiwan but also wants predictable relations with China. To achieve this, the U.S. has adopted strategic ambiguity as the cornerstone of its policy towards the cross-Strait relations.

The United States adopts the one-China policy to soothe China’s concerns that Taiwan may formally secede from China, but at the same time warns China that military action against Taiwan cannot be tolerated. Such vague and consistent backings from the US pushes Taiwan to be more confrontational with China thereby depending upon American promises. This is exactly the sort of situation the West had put Ukraine in the last decade.

Reassessments in a multipolar global order

With Ukraine now being able to understand its own limitations, Russia’s concerns and ambiguous guarantees from the West, it is high time that Taiwan understands this without having to go through a military confrontation in the region. In a multipolar world, diplomacy and self-reliance as opposed to security guarantees is the way forward. The unipolar moment has passed and countries especially Taiwan must seek to re align and reposition itself in the changing geopolitics. East Asian countries must limit reliance on foreign guarantees and look for practical solutions with neighboring countries to avoid military clashes. This must be done in tandem with strengthening defense at home and diplomacy abroad. As American political and military ambitions abroad wane, countries that depend on it for security must learn from the Ukrainian example.

* Views expressed in the article are author's own.