Turkey’s Incirlik Offer To Russia Is Ankara’s July 4 “Present” To Washington

Building off of the President Erdogan’s surprise re-pivot towards the multipolar world, the Turkish Foreign Minister announced on the anniversary of American Independence that his country was considering inviting Russia to the Incirlik airbase in order to carry out anti-Daesh operations. According to RT, the military site is presently being used by “US, German, British, Qatar, and Saudi air forces”, similar in effect to how the tiny country of Djibouti and its capital are being multilaterally used by American, French, Japanese, Saudi, and Chinese forces. 

If Moscow carries through on Ankara’s proposal, then it would dramatically symbolize the Turkish government’s seriousness to reorienting its strategic vision eastward towards the emerging multipolar world order, which as was analyzed previously, is motivated by the dual situational factors of the EU’s rejection of Turkey and the US’ support of militant Kurdish separatism. It also can’t be forgotten that regardless of what ultimately happens with this unexpected development, Erdogan is sending an unequivocally strong message to Washington by having his government make this announcement on July Fourth, the “holy day” for all American Exceptionalists. 

From the looks of things, it can be persuasively argued that Russia and Turkey have reached some sort of “backroom agreement” with one another as part of their ‘détente’, since it’s otherwise unthinkable that an American ‘ally’ as geostrategically critical at this moment as Turkey is would ever even countenance publicly inviting the Russian military to use the same airbase as Ankara’s fellow NATO ‘friends’ and GCC cohorts. That being said, Erdogan is a slippery leader who can’t at all be fully trusted, and it’s not impossible that he carried out this stunt with the intention of extracting some sort of concession from the US as regards its midwifing of the “geopolitical Israel” of “Kurdistan”. 

It doesn’t seem conceivable at this point that the US will back down from its unstated commitment to carving out a “Kurdistan” in the heart of the Mideast, but it might make some symbolic concessions to Turkey such as limiting the number of special forces that are training the YPG and/or “reassuring” Ankara of Washington’s support for Turkish “sovereignty”, both of which would be nothing more than time-buying pretenses for assembling a Hybrid War coalition against Erdogan. 

Ironically, the very same domestic factors that some analysts had previously thought could be leveraged by Russian special services in destabilizing their country’s southern pro-American rival – left-wing militants, Kurdish separatists, a dissatisfied middle class, and military mistrust – could now be exploited by American intelligence agencies to offset the pro-Russian pivot that NATO’s easternmost member is in the process of openly commencing. 

It must be reminded at this juncture that Ankara’s multipolar leanings aren’t as unexpected as casual observers might believe, since the author’s comprehensive country profile about Turkey that was included in the book-length article series about “The Meaning Of Multipolarity” details the geopolitical naturalness of this choice, though admittedly was highly skeptical that Erdogan would pursue it. With the Turkish strongman seemingly intent on safeguarding his state’s sovereignty and preempting the eventual emergence of an American-backed transnational (possibly even sub-state) “Kurdistan” that could catalyze his country’s eventual dissolution, it looks ever the more likely that Ankara will continue with its multipolar reorientation despite the very real risk of falling victim to a Hybrid War plot.