Kurz and Orban’s Austria-Hungary: Migrants, ‘Paks’, and the Visegrad

Kurz and Orban have a lot in common, from a ‘right-wing’ political form to mutually beneficial cooperation on certain practical issues.

Kurz won a majority during the October parliamentary elections in Austria, and in December he reached a coalition agreement with the anti-migrant populist Freedom Party, which is led by Hein-Christian Strache. Strache became vice-chancellor and Kurz became federal chancellor. As Reuters noted, during the election campaign Strache even argued with Kurz about which of them has better relations with Orban. However, arguments are unnecessary: on the eve of his visit, Orban promised in a Facebook video that he would visit both leaders.

As exports note, Austria is now the only West-European country with a ‘very right-wing party’ in government. The same is said of the Orban government in the Eastern European area. His ‘Fidesz’ party was fairly liberal in the 90’s, but in the 2000’s its image changed and it slowly started shifting towards the right. Protests in 2006 and demands for a harder and more conservative course in 2010 also contributed to the rightward shift.

Today, Orban is the main fighter for Hungary’s national interests and for the country’s independence from several forced EU decisions (primarily on the migrant question). He is the initiator of a strengthening of the Visegrad group and is often compared to other strong leaders, like, for example, Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Kurz is less combative towards EU policy and is more loyal to Brussels, despite his right-wing orientation. The two leaders hold similar opinions on conservative issues, and competition in some other areas does not exclude mutually beneficial alliances.

- The first point on which differences of opinion between Vienna and Budapest may appear is Poland. While Orban has set out on a strong vector of a maximal rapprochement with Warsaw on a whole series of questions, the Austrian leadership insists on several punitive measures against Poland for “threats to legality and democratic principles”. 

- The second point (and perhaps the most important) is the construction of the ‘Paks-2’ nuclear power station. The original ‘Paks’ is a Soviet inheritance which de facto secures the lion’s share of Hungary’s electricity. The preliminary cost of ‘Rosatom’s’ construction project to be executed jointly with Hungary was fixed in December 2014 at 12,5 billion euros. The beginning of the station’s construction is expected in 2018. Commercial exploitation will start either in 2025 or 2026.

Series differences of opinion can rear their head in the case of this issue: two days ago, Austria even turned to the European Criminal Court with a request to annul the Eurocommission’s approval of the construction of two new reactors. Vienna’s formal complaint is that nuclear energy is “neither a stable source of energy, nor an answer to climate change”. Other European states hold, that the deal is “not transparent” and that construction should thus be stopped.

In fact, what is really scaring Hungary’s Western neighbours is that the country will cooperate with Russia, receive investments, and gain relative economic independence away from the EU.

And where there is economic cooperation, the famous “Russian footprint” is also seen. The Hungarian leadership is now under very heavy pressure because of “cooperation with Russia”. Orban is not afraid to make statements about his good relations to Moscow; however, he must be careful.

- The third point on which Orban and Kurz’s opinions don’t coincide is the indexing of family allowances for children living abroad. This is related to the countries’ tax policies. This is about Hungarians who live in Austria with their children; for a long time, Vienna has been talking about stripping Hungarian new arrivals of their tax preferences.