On the issue of the denunciation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Treaty. Part IV.

Part I

Part II

Part III

The analysis of motives for possible denunciation of the INF Treaty

The expert community provides the following reasons for Russia’s favorability of denouncing the INF Treaty.

1. The group of missiles of intermediate and short range can become the important instrument of regional control in modern geostrategic conditions.

2. The group of missiles of intermediate and short range can be used to counteract the regional American system of the global AMD.

3. A situation when participants of the INF Treaty comprise only a small number of world states, and other nations have the right to create missiles of intermediate and short range for needs of their own defense – this clearly constitutes discrimination in relation to the participants of the agreement.

4. In recent years, the United States regularly violated the INF Treaty.

5. The INF Treaty lost its prior military-political meaning, and so the revision of the system of international treaties on European safety is necessary.

According to some experts, Russia is justified in leaving the INF Treaty because the reasons its inclusion are not put forward in absolute terms. Meaning, there are no substantial reasons and/or pretexts to justify the INF Treaty.

According to other experts, on the contrary, these reasons are closely connected and mutually supplemental to each other.

Let's analyze in more detail the possible reasons for the denunciation of the INF Treaty by Russia.

4.1. The group of missiles of intermediate and short range can become the important instrument of regional control in modern geostrategic conditions

 In fact, this constitutes the main argument for Russia’s exit from the INF Treaty. After all, the exit from this agreement is not meaningful if Russia does not plan to create the missile systems forbidden to them.

For more than two decades our country went without land based missiles of intermediate and short range. Lately, however, the situation drastically changed.

Despite a decrease in the probability of a global war, there have been new threats lining up in close proximity to Russia’s borders, which represent a real threat to Russian national security.

Among these threats, NATO is advancing East – this constitutes an essential change which is detrimental to Russian security because it threatens the peace-time ratios of Russian armed forces. China is another concern – which has been intensifying its military capabilities via nuclear weapons and creating better means of missile delivery. This has also been true of a number of other states bordering Russia – a situation aggravating the frontier regions and intensifying the possibility of international terrorism.

Let's pay attention to these new threats – threats on a regional level. In addition, at the intercontinental level, global control continues to be provided with the Russian SNW.

Let's also pay attention that for other parties connected to the INF Treaty, such as the United States, similar regional threats of safety do not exist.

With the changing geostrategic conditions our country has experienced since the end of the Cold War, we could consider that a group of missiles of intermediate (first of all) and short range could be important additional instruments of regional protection, used as a counterbalance to the superiority in number of the armies and conventional arms of the countries of NATO, as well as some other the states.

And if the majority of experts are in agreement on the question of the existence of regional threats to the safety of the Russian Federation, then on the question of threat prevention, the expert community was nevertheless divided.

Supporters of maintaining the INF Treaty believe that for preventing the increase of intermediate-range threats, the available Russian intercontinental missiles – which provide nuclear control on all operational directions and ranges without missiles of intermediate-range – are sufficient.

In addition for the prevention of probable regional threats (except SNW) it cannot be used on strategic (front or tactical) aircraft, nor can missiles be used against the coastal countries via ships and submarines. Nonetheless, for national defense Russia also develops its aerospace capabilities.

In case these forces will be insufficient for preventing regional threats, the further development of additional ICBM is suggested. According to supporters of this approach, all this will keep new Agreement ceilings (700 carriers and 1550 warheads) within the SOA with a large supply – this will not conflict with the existing limits imposed by the INF Treaty.

To justify this position, the argument is made that a wide-ranging intercontinental delivery system is a more universal weapon of protection in comparison with missiles of intermediate-range. For example, the same ICBM can strike blows to the truncated trajectories of intermediate-range systems.

An advantage of this approach is also the reduction of the number of different types of missiles being produced.

The essential expenses necessary for the development of new missiles of intermediate-range are also noted.

Conversely, the supporters of the denunciation of the INF Treaty believe that land missiles of intermediate-range are the most expedient for protection against regional threats.

Thus, part of the tasks assigned earlier to the SNW group (and relating to the Eurasian landmass) can be redistributed among the RAR perspective group.

After all, a portion of the ICBM at intermediate-range reduces the potential of retaliation of SNW on an opposing force’s objects of intercontinental range. It is also impossible to exclude that, under the existing international legal restrictions of the SOA, the expansion of America’s AMD global system and the increase in threats to Russia at intermediate-range – all these factors increase the probability that the domestic SNW will be insufficient for the nuclear protection of Russia in all directions and at all ranges.

It should also be known that the INF Treaty forbids nuclear missiles of intermediate-range to be used not only for the solution of regional problems but also for the solution of specific fighting objectives in conflicts of a regional scale on Russia’s borders. The application of such means could affect the outcome of operations.

On the question of cost for the reconstruction of missiles of intermediate and short range, this demands careful economic analysis. Previously it was possible to assume that such expenses would not be very expensive for the domestic economy. After all, it is obvious that the development of new missile systems of intermediate and short range can be conducted on the basis of the already created and fulfilled arms (Topol family and operational and tactical missile system "Iskander" ICBM). This is available on both a scientific and production basis.

The formation of specific fighting objectives and options quantitative and qualitative groups of missiles of intermediate and short range should be carried out on the basis of the detailed analysis of potential regional threats to the Russian Federation.

We will carry out only a brief and preliminary analysis of such threats below.

The potential Western threat to Russian national security is defined by an essential superiority of NATO’s armed forces (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in relation to the armed forces of Russia. Let's remind the reader that at the signing of the INF Treaty the situation was reverse – i.e. the USSR and the Warsaw Pact was superior to NATO in military capability.

The further expansion of NATO to the East only strengthens an imbalance of forces between the alliance and Russia. Thus there are fears that the large contingents of armed forces of NATO can be placed in the territory of her new members in close proximity to the borders of Russia. Another serious fear in connection with the expansion of NATO is the essential increase of NATO’s long-range arms which can destroy major Russian targets.

Despite the official declaration of partnership between Russia and NATO, contradictions in questions of ensuring mutual safety are yet to be resolved. A key aspect of the military strategy of NATO is in carrying out its policy of security from an aggressive position of greater force – i.e. NATO’s strategic installations officially allow the possibility of the application of its military force outside of the North Atlantic geographical zone.

The North Atlantic alliance’s forcing of hostilities between Europe and Russia can be considered improbable. However NATO can still try to use its military force on Russian territory in case of an aggravation of any ethno-religious conflict.

Another way Russia can be involved in a military conflict with NATO can be connected with the emergence of a crisis situation in the area “between Russia and NATO” (Ukraine, Transnistria, Transcaucasia, etc.). Such a situation can become the precondition for the possible intervention of neighboring NATO countries and Russia’s direct involvement in the conflict. Thus, the existence of powerful armies in the immediate regions bordering Russia can provoke armed actions on a large-scale.

The military-political situation in the Far East is formed under the influence of strengthening the international position of China and amplifying the rivalry for a repartition of spheres of influence in the Asian and Pacific region.

Despite the small probability of the application of military force against Russia in this region, local conflicts of varying intensity can still arise which can infringe on the interests of Russia. In the future, the possibility of large-scale conflicts is therefore not excluded. Situations which can potentially destabilize Russia include the ongoing Taiwanese and Korean problems.

Despite a considerable improvement in Sino-Russian relations in recent years, it would be wrong not to be ever mindful of the increasing political clout of China – specifically, its growing economic power and future military potential. A possible change in Chinese foreign policy can create future potential threats to the interests of Russia in the region and to Russia’s own territorial integrity. These threats can come as a result of any number of following changes: the implementation of reforms and a change in the ratio of China’s military forces, a difficult demographic situation in China, an increase in an imbalance of the Chinese population in the frontier regions of China and Russia, etc.

At the emergence of a crisis situation in Sino-Russian bilateral relations, China can put its armed forces on alert against Russia under the pretext of protecting its national security, its interests, and the Chinese living in the Far East. In the long-term, there is also the prospect that upon the achievement of considerable advantages in economic and military areas, China can return to its former claims on Russian territories in the Far East and Siberia, which China has historically considered theirs. At the same time, considering the interest of China in the raw material resources of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and the relative weakness of the republics of the CIS, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of future Russian involvement in Chinese intervention in these states.

It should be noted that the majority of vital strategic, administrative, political and military facilities of eastern Russia are well within the reach of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRAR. It should also be known that the RAR "Pioneer" Asian group (directed by China) was also destroyed according to the INF Treaty.

An important influence on the regional situation is rendered also by Japan which continues to actively increase its military potential. And although Japan is not now considered a military threat to Russia, its considerable military potential and absence of a peace treaty with Russia, in addition to territorial disputes, do not stabilize the strategic situation. It is impossible to exclude the possibility that, in case of a retraction of Russia in large-scale military conflicts in the west or south, the Japanese government can go on the offensive to capture the disputed territories now controlled by Russia.

In the southwest and southern border regions it should be noted that there is an extensive belt of instability and ongoing conflicts in the Asian region (e.g. Transcaucasia, the Middle East, Central and the Southern Asia).

It is impossible to exclude the possibility that this region can become a source of threats for the safety of Russia. The most probable scenario of Russian involvement in this region is in a conflict with foreign states which meddle in the affairs of the states of the CIS (former USSR) – states with which Russia is connected by the Agreement on collective security (CSTO).

So in Transcaucasia, an armed conflict can fuel tension between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. For the localization and the termination of peacekeeping functions, Russia can use its military and thus become a participant in this kind of a conflict. In case of the development of the conflict into a local war, there will be a real precondition for the possible intervention of Turkey, and perhaps other NATO countries. As for other potentially dangerous areas of Central Asia, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that paramilitary groups of Islamic fundamentalists can ignite border conflict with the states of the CIS.

In addition, the distribution of nuclear weapons and missile technologies in the Asian region has intensified in recent years. Thus the territory of Russia is located within the range of existing and prospective missile delivery systems of a number of these Asian states.

In the foreseeable future in the Eurasian region, there can be a wide range of regional military threats to the safety of Russia, not excluding in certain conditions large-scale military aggression.

Land-based missiles of intermediate and short range can become an effective remedy for the elimination of these threats.

The following main objectives can be assigned to group the prospective domestic ballistic missile systems presently within the INF:

- regional nuclear control of large-scale aggression against Russia on the Eurasian continent at the expense of the possibility of inflicting an essential damage to the military-economic potential to the opponent;

- providing a de-escalation of the regional conflict on the Eurasian continent by initiating precautionary blows, allowing to strike separate objects of an opponent’s armies and military-economic potential – and at the expense of applying high-precision, non-nuclear, low-power weapons;

- suppression of large-scale aggression against Russia by defeating the army groups of the opponent and inflicting mandatory damage to the military-economic potential of the opponent;

- control of further expansion of the infrastructure of NATO in the East (first of all, preventing the expansion of nuclear delivery vehicles in the new countries of NATO adjacent to the borders of Russia) and containing the possible strengthening of Chinese army groups on Russia’s borders.

4.2. The group of missiles of intermediate and short range can be used in regionally counteracting the ability of the American global AMD system

 This motive for an exit of Russia from the INF Treaty is close to the previous. After all, both of them are connected with the INF’s group expansion in the interests of ensuring national security of the Russian Federation. The first is only concerned with counteracting the shock systems of eventual opponents, and the second - to counteract defensive (in fact) AMD systems of the US.

The AMD system created by the US, in the long term, is capable of threatening Russian nuclear control – this is proven by the accurate organizational research of the Russian Defense Ministry.

The greatest concern of Russia is caused thus by the European segment of the AMD of the US which means of interception will be most approached to areas of the SOA of the Russian missiles.

In 2007, the George W. Bush administration in the US sounded plans of expansion – the so-called, third item region of the strategic AMD of the US in Europe. This consisted of 10 mine anti-missiles of distant interception of GBI in Poland and stationary RLS of support and the prompting of anti-missiles in the Czech Republic.

In 2009 the new Obama administration declared its refusal to expand the third item region of the US’s AMD in Europe. And alternatively, “The stage-by-stage adaptive approach” to the placement of antimissile systems of the US in Europe was offered for this project new. According to this approach, the expansion of non-strategic anti-missiles of sea and which are land based (of the Standart-3 family) is planned in the territory of Poland and Romania, and also by sea in the coastal areas around Europe.

According to a new approach, the development of the US’s AMD program in Europe was planned to be carried out in four stages, through the gradual accumulation of the quantity of means of the AMD, and also through the interception of missiles – from operational and tactical, at the first stage, to intercontinental at the fourth stage.

In 2013 the US declared its latest update of the AMD program. With reference to the European AMD it was declared that there would be changes to the fourth stage – i.e. the “Stage-by-stage adaptive approach”, which caused the greatest objections by Russia.

However, this updating of the American plans on the AMD did not remove the basic Russian concern over the European segment of the AMD.

The goal of the US is to create, near our western borders, an advanced region of the global AMD in aggregate with the accumulation of efforts in the field of technologies of the interception of missiles on a site of their dispersal (an active site).

Military experts in the US do not hide the belief that the main connection of any option of the perspective strategic AMD is the interception and destruction over the territory of the potential opponent of the SOA with regard to the selection of missiles on a site of their dispersal. In this case solutions are not required for one of the most difficult tasks in the field of the AMD – e.g. selections of warheads against hindrances and masking objects. Besides, at missile interception on active site fragments of the destroyed nuclear warheads and means of overcoming of the AMD fall in the territory of the opponent or neighboring states.

Representatives of the military-political leadership of the US assure the public that the developed AMD system has a limited character and does not represent any threat to the Russian nuclear capability. The official reason for the creation of the AMD system is that Washington is concerned over the activity of the nuclear missile sphere in regions surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran.

It is remarkable, however, that the international arrangements reached concerning the Iranian nuclear program in November 2013, in Geneva, were not reflected in any way in plans on the creation of the European segment of the AMD. Although the U.S. President Barack Obama also declared earlier that if the Iranian threat were to be eliminated, then incentives for the creation of the AMD in Europe will disappear. However on December 16, 2013 the head of the Pentagon Chuck Hagel, during a videoconference with the Russian Minister of Defense, reported that despite the Geneva arrangements across Iran, the further construction of the AMD in Europe will not be suspended.

New information on antimissiles, in connection with events in Ukraine, is also remarkable. More frank were statements concerning the AMD which some Western politicians now openly consider as a military counterbalance to Russia, having forgotten former admonitions. And some Ukrainian politicians even declared the possibility of placing some elements of the American AMD in Ukraine.

According to experts at the Heritage Foundation, the situation that has developed regarding the construction of the European AMD, in connection with the Ukrainian events, demands a thorough revision of approaches of the military-political leadership of the US. Specialists of various American think-tanks as well as some leading American congressmen, retired high-ranking military personnel, and politicians also agree.

All these signs only confirm Russian fears - the AMD in Europe within its present plans is focused on destroying Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

In these conditions, to counteract the US’s AMD of the US is an actual problem of national security for Russia.

Thus along with political, diplomatic and informational measures – military and technical measures to counteract the AMD are also considered. Among them, include the destruction of AMD sites in Europe.

Such statements came from Russian officials at the highest levels.

So, the successful tests of the new R-500 cruise missile carried out in 2007 for an operational and tactical missile system of the Iskander type became, according to the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, the answer to the US’s expansion of AMD elements in Europe.

On November 5, 2008 the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, in his appeal to the Federal Meeting, designated a number of possible countermeasures on the expansion of the third item region of the AMD. Among such measures included the placement in the Kaliningrad region of Russia the operational and tactical Iskander missile system.

On November 23, 2011 the President Medvedev made the statement in connection with a situation which developed around the AMD system and the countries of NATO in Europe. In it he declared the possible placement of modern shock systems which would defeat the AMD European component in the west and south of Russia. In particular he mentioned the expansion of the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad region.

Placed in the territory of the Kaliningrad region, the Iskander complexes have a range of trajectory of up to 500 km (which is authorized in the INF Treaty) and are capable of covering all the territory of Poland and of carrying out the task of destroying all American AMD objects placed there.

The commander of the missile armies and artillery ground armies of Russia declared in the press that the problem of the country’s leaders of OTRK "Iskander" will be solved by placing the missiles the Kaliningrad region and "will be carried out if needed, in established periods".

As to the statement for the possible placement of OTRK "Iskander" in the south, in the expert community the point of view expressed was that it could go from the Krasnodar Region as the closest Russian region to the AMD of the US in Romania (the Air Force’s former base to Devesela). Now the Russian region next to Romania is the Crimea.

However, from the Krasnodar and Crimean Regions, the OTRK "Iskander" (resolved by the INF Treaty) does not reach the territory of the US’s AMD base in Romania.

The range of a complex can be increased, according to information provided in the mass media and among military experts. However, in this case, Russia is beyond the INF Treaty.

Thus, for the destruction of AMD sites in Europe, missiles of intermediate and short range can be used. Let's recall that the possibility of a Russian exit from the INF Treaty as to a countermeasure on the European segment of the AMD, was declared in 2007 by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation – Gen. Baluyevsky.

4.3. A situation when participants of the INF Treaty are only some states of the world, and the others have the right to create missiles of intermediate and short range for defense purposes, is discriminatory against participants of the agreement.

 A similar argument, in particular, was voiced in a well-known speech of President Putin at the Munich conference on safety of policy issues.

Really, many states have missiles of intermediate and short range on classification of the INF Treaty – they develop and use them in ensuring the national security.

Let's recall that by the time of the signing of the INF Treaty, France and China were the only two nations (other than the USSR and the US) that possessed land based missiles of intermediate and short range.  And France subsequently eliminated these systems.

Now, on an extreme measure, already seven states of the world possess land based missiles of intermediate-range on classification of the INF Treaty (that is, at a range between 1000 and 5500 km). It is China, India, Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Curiously, according to official statements coming out of Washington, Iranian and North Korean missiles forced the US to create the AMD global system.

On the classification of the INF Treaty (i.e. at a range of 500 to 1000 km), (besides the abovementioned seven countries), Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Turkey, South Korea have missiles of short range.

Thus, all seven of the states with missiles of intermediate-range geographically are within reach of Russian territory (including, China, India, Israel, Pakistan - with missiles in nuclear equipment), and some of the states (China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Turkey) are capable of reaching the territory of the Russian Federation with missiles of short range.

According to A. Arbatov, “the groundless association in one heap of all countries having missiles of intermediate-range, impresses politicians and the public, but does not maintain the sober strategic analysis”.

Really, it is difficult to disagree with this statement. The majority of owners of the weapon of this class, at least at the present stage, hardly intend to use it against Russia. For example, India focuses its missiles on China and Pakistan, Pakistan aims its missiles against India, Israel, Iran and other Arab countries, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tries to threaten the US and its allies (namely South Korea and Japan). Due to the fact that political and military intentions can change, some of these countries could potentially threaten Russia in the future.

Certainly, the idea of a future competition between Russia and all such countries having missiles of intermediate and short range looks absolutely far-fetched and extremely expensive.

However there is no question about it. The fact is that an increasing number of states are seizing or attempting to seize technologies of missiles of intermediate and short range for the need of self-defense. The ban on them concerns only the narrowest number of the countries - the US and assignees of the USSR under the INF Treaty. Thus if for the US such systems actually also are not necessary, considering the closest geographical neighbors of the US, Russia could use them for ensuring its own safety.

4.4. The United States regularly breaks the INF Treaty

 According to the Russian side, the United States regularly breaks the INF Treaty

Among the main Russian claims against the US:

- use by the United States in interests of working off of AMD system of the missiles targets similar on characteristics to missiles of intermediate and short range;

- production of the fighting pilotless aircraft falling under validity about INF Treaty by the United States;

- planned expansion by the United States in Poland and Romania within the framework of “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach,” the land Mk-41 launchers capable of deploying SOA cruise missiles of intermediate-range.

According to A. Arbatov, “Russia, as it often happens, reacts to claims of the US reciprocally ”.

However here it is necessary to categorically disagree with this expert. The Russian claims against Washington in violation of the INF Treaty started to be expressed nearly 15 years ago, long before the West’s disinformation campaign accusing Russia of violating this agreement.

4.4.1. Missile targets

In January 2001 there was a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “In the US there is an experience of creation on the basis of the second and third steps of ICBM ‘Minitmen-2’ of the missile target of the land based ballistic missile of intermediate-range of the new HERA type in defiance of the INF Treaty. The question of violations of the Agreement by the United States about  INF Treaty at various levels was repeatedly put forward by the Russian side. However the satisfactory answer from the American side still did not follow’.

Subsequently official claims were repeated. So, in August 2010 the following statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “The American side systematically breaks basic provisions of the INF Treaty, using for working off of elements of AMD system the missiles targets simulating ballistic missiles of intermediate-range, the HERA, LRALT and MRT type. According to the INF Treaty, carrying out SOA-up of these missiles is qualified as test of land based ballistic missiles of intermediate-range of new type which is in violation of Article VI”.

According to the same A. Arbatov, in the INF Treaty there is a point allowing for the usage of elements of missiles of intermediate-range for testing the AMD systems as targets, without intending to destroy them.

It is represented that in this case this expert is hardly right.

It is obvious that it is a question of the provision of item 3 of article VII of the INF Treaty. Namely, “the land based ballistic missile of the type created and tested only for the interception of objects, not being on Earth’s surface – it is not considered that these missiles are restricted by the INF Treaty”.

In this situation, with all evidence, it is a question of antimissiles, but not about missile targets. And the missile target simulating the ballistic missile of intermediate-range, in fact, also is the missile of intermediate-range, that is it is a weapon delivery system which is set on "train" during anti-missile tests.

The certificate of that the same HERA is the ballistic missile of intermediate-range, its technical characteristics, and also use fact serve in its structure of equipment of a control system of the missile of intermediate-range of "Pershing-2" also. Let's recall, in this regard, that Pershing-2 missiles were liquidated by a method of burning, but with preservation of instrument compartments and the subsequent dismantle of elements of a control system. As a result Americans kept devices of a control system of Pershing-2 missiles which are now used for the production of missile targets.

The United States for a legal justification qualify the missiles targets as the accelerating means resolved by the INF Treaty. According to item 12 of article VII of the INF Treaty “each of the parties has the right to make and use for accelerating means which otherwise could be considered as the missile of intermediate-range or the short range, only existing types of accelerating steps”.

The US really use for missiles targets of intermediate-range (HERA, LRALT and MRT) existing types of accusing steps (“Minuteman-2”, "Trident-1", "Castor").

However according to the item 12b of article VII of the INF Treaty SOA-up of such accelerating means are not considered as flight tests of missiles of intermediate-range and short range provided that such accelerating means are used only with a view of researches and development for test of objects, but not accelerating means.

That is it is a question of tests of any useful loading of accelerating means, for example, for a conclusion in space or in an upper atmosphere. However in the case under consideration it does not occur. The same HERA missile at the initial stage, as we know, in general was tested independently, that is tests of the most accelerating means were carried out. Therefore SOA-up of missiles targets of the US also are treated by the Russian side as SOA-up of missiles of intermediate-range of new type that is direct violation of the INF Treaty.

According to the general designer  MEATH Yu. Solomonova, “Americans in defiance of the INF Treaty actually created the missile of intermediate-range”.

According to M. Vildanov, “causes bewilderment that violation by Americans of provisions of the INF Treaty did not become a subject of concern of the top military-political management of the Russian Federation, a subject of meetings of heads of defensive and foreign policy departments of the Russian Federation and the US, discussions in profile committees of the Federation Council”. He considers that “irresolute actions of the Russian side created to Americans favorable conditions for development and tests global and the EUROAMD” and that “the Russian side, in the presence of political will, could use competently violations by Americans of provisions of the INF Treaty and demand stay of tests global and the EUROAMD to full permission of problem questions and removal of our excitement”.

Such criticism is certainly fair. Still Russia used only bilateral diplomatic format for permission of this problem. It would be necessary more persistently and to use widely multilateral international forums, to draw attention of parliaments and the public of the countries of the world, mass media (as it is done by the US now, accusing Russia of violation of the INF Treaty).

 4.4.2 Pilotless aircraft

Other claim of Russia to Washington concerning implementation of the INF Treaty is test and use of shock pilotless aircraft of the corresponding range by the United States, in particular PA "Predator" range about 1000 km.

According to the INF Treaty, land based drone pilotless aircraft with a range from 500 to 5500 km can be classified as land based cruise missiles of intermediate and short range which are forbidden by this agreement.

Reference: The term "cruise missile" means it is pilotless and equipped with own propulsion system whose flight for the most part of its trajectory is provided at the expense of use of aerodynamic carrying power.

The term "the land based cruise missile" means the cruise missile is land based, which is a weapon delivery system.

Now the US is actively carrying out work on the creation of PA which have already proved in operations, and this all-important significance is attached. Thus if before PA were used only for investigation, during operations in Afghanistan in 2001 of PA already began to be used successfully as the weapon, that is for defeat of the land purposes.

Pilotless aircraft have a number of clear advantages over the piloted: they are short and more maneuverable, they consume less fuel, make essentially lower demands to airfields, do not demand life support systems and expensive preparation of pilots – thus the person can operate several crafts at the same time from the ground.

According to available open data, in the context of the INF Treaty, Americans considered PA problem on specially created interdepartmental commission. Special meeting of National Security council under the direction of the U.S. President which approved an official position of the military-political leadership of the US was held even. According to this position “shock PA should not be considered within the INF Treaty as are intended for repeated application, and after performance of fighting tasks they come back to point of a constant dislocation, and land based cruise missiles are means of disposable action”. Further the American experts declared that “shock PA cannot be considered as land based cruise missiles as these have no launchers”.

However such treatments do not correspond to the INF Treaty where unequivocal definition of the term “land based winged missiles” is made, and PA with all evidence fall under this definition.

The American representatives, also repeatedly declared that when signing the INF Treaty of shock PA did not exist even in projects. It the arisen legal collision also speaks.

Certainly, it is possible to agree with it. However it does not justify violation of the INF Treaty, and demands, at least, specification of its some terms within Special control commission.

Russia as it is represented, is also interested in PA own program development.

Mk-41 launchers

In the framework of “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach” the United States plans to develop in Poland and Romania Standard-3 antimissiles on land Mk-41 launchers.

However according to available data, universal Mk-41 launchers can be used both for the SOA of antimissiles, and for the SOA of cruise missiles of intermediate-range such as the "Tomahawk". Therefore the land option of these launchers can be considered as direct violation of the INF Treaty.

Let's recall that according to Article VII of the INF Treaty “if the launcher was tested for SOA of the land based cruise missile of, all launchers of this type are considered as tested for SOA of land based cruise missiles”.

And according to article VI of the INF Treaty “each of the parties does not make any land based  launchers of missiles of intermediate and short range”.

Besides, there are suspicions that in Mk-41 launchers in Romania and Poland instead of anti-missiles, combat land based cruise missiles of intermediate-range can be developed though forbidden by the INF Treaty. These missiles are capable to striking crucial and strategic objects on the European part of the territory of Russia.

Thus, the analysis carried-out  showed that the United States has regularly broken the INF Treaty in recent years. In these conditions, as believes a number of experts, Russia has the right to raise the question about a withdrawal from the INF treaty. Agreements should be observed only with a diligent partner.

The truth is that there is also other point of view. Supporters of saving of the INF Treaty consider that the problems arising have a technical character and can be resolved within the special control commission without a denunciation of the INF Treaty. For example, a new definition of the term "cruise missile", deducing LA from the right field of the INF Treaty can co-ordinate the parties. Or to agree about placement of antimissiles in technically distinguished launchers with the possibility of their inspections on location.

Let's thus pay special attention to the circumstance that the special control commission under the INF Treaty was not convoked in more than ten years. Its last session took place in October of 2003.

4.5. The INF Treaty lost its former military-political meaning, a revision of the system of international treaties on security in Europe is necessary

 The INF Treaty though consisted between leading powers of the world (the USSR and the US) treated, first of all, the European region and had a regional character.

Together with the prisoner soon after it the CCAE (Agreement on conventional arms in Europe) it made the base of system of the European safety in the conditions of bipolar opposition in Europe two leading military-political blocks - the Warsaw Treaty Organizations and NATO.

The INF Treaty aimed to reduce nuclear friction on the European continent, to reduce the probability of the emergence of a regional nuclear conflict and its development into global war.

The CCAE aimed to lower the resistance of regular groups of armed forces of the Department of Internal Affairs and NATO, to reduce imbalances in the sphere of conventional arms and the potential for the engagement of sudden attack and offensive actions in Europe.

However over time, after the conclusion of these agreements, the geopolitical situation considerably changed.

The USSR - one of two parties of the INF Treaty and one of the leading parties CCAE, heading the Warsaw Pact broke up. Stop assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization., which however did not lead to NATO dissolution. Moreover, some former federal republics of the USSR and the country of the Warsaw Pact in which territory for NATO control missiles of intermediate and short range and the considerable contingents of usual armed forces earlier took place, are members of NATO or aspire to the accession to alliance.

A number of related issues of safety in Europe which were put even during negotiations on the INF Treaty was not solved.

Let's remind that during negotiations on INF the Soviet Union insisted on the account in balance of forces in Europe of nuclear means of the European countries of NATO - Great Britain and France, and also aviation nuclear means of the US of the advanced basing of intermediate-range.

Showing readiness to make concessions at late stages of negotiations, the Soviet management, obviously, the solution of these questions in the future hoped for possibility. However it did not occur.

Now in Europe aviation not strategic arms of the US - about 200 nuclear air bombs B-61 in warehouses in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Germany remain. These bombs are intended for delivery by strike fighters of the U.S. Air Force of the F-16 type, and also planes of the countries of NATO.

The situation with safety of the Russian Federation also is aggravated now with plans of expansion of the European segment of the global AMD of the US.

Thus, in modern conditions the operating system of agreements on safety in Europe does not carry out the mission, lost the former military-political meaning and demands revision.

Current situation already made necessary taking measures to stay of action CCAE by the Russian Federation. The relevant decision was accepted Russia in 2007. Stay of action CCAE by Russia is means of fight of Russia for verification regime updating over arms in Europe.

From the point of view of interests of national security of the Russian Federation the verification regime over the arms, considering a number of related issues of safety in Europe - missiles of intermediate and short range, not strategic nuclear weapon of the US in Europe, usual armed forces, the EUROAMD should become fair.