The coup without guns: Brazil’s political drama

08.09.2016

Brazil is going through a time of political instability and power shuffles. It is the “end” of an era and the beginning of a new one. However, this does not mean the beginning of a "new framework", but the resumption of an old scheme. The Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Worker’s Party) started its era back in the year 2003 with Luis Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula ruled until 2011, when he was succeeded by Dilma Roussef who ruled from 2011 to the August 31st, 2016. However, unlike Lula, Dilma did not finish her government career through a normal process. She was interrupted by a parliamentary coup, a “legal” coup. 

On charges of "tax pedaling" (fraud on income and misuse of public money), she was removed from power by a political class that effectively commits the same crimes (or even worse ones) of which she was accused. Mr. Michel Temer who had been elected along with her as vice president, assumed the presidency after the coup. 

The resources used by Dilma were (and still are) commonly used by other governments not only in Brazil, but in several countries. The expansion of the public debt limit, the expansion of credit limits, and the non-disclosure of real numbers (or their modification) are recurrent practices of governments inherent to an international financial economic system based on debt and the dollar (the US itself does such too). Fernando Collor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luís Inácio Lula made use of these devices, but it seems that Dilma was appointed as a sort of "scapegoat”.

The coup process, conducted as a kind of "moral crusade" and call for a "popular outcry for justice", did not comply with the minimum procedures of legality and constitutionality. In fact, most of the charges against Dilma were forced into the official process. And, in relation to charges of fiscal irresponsibility, there was no effective investigation or a clear conclusion about the guilt of the accused.

The judiciary and parliament actually took over political control, and the old oligarchs, incorporated in the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, to whom Michel Temer belongs) party and its allied base, got rid of the PT and are now controlling the country's politics in direct ways (as they always have, effectively serving as a pressure and blackmail tool for all governments in Brazil since the end of the military regime).

The whole process can be summarized as follows: criminals judge an alleged accused and replace her with their accomplice. And, with the support of major national media channels, the whole process is validated by "popular support" (in fact, the popularity of Dilma was very low), i.e., support of masses who, unfortunately, are subject to error and have no idea of the true intentions in this process.

The beginning of the timid Dilma’s policies against big financial interests may also be one of the real reasons for her removal from power. Now, with the old oligarchs in command, Brazil’s sabotage process, supported by the Atlanticist powers, can proceed at a faster pace.