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Ukraine: a union of oligarchs and nationalists. Part III
From the first day of nation-building in Ukraine the ukrainian nationalists are in a state of cognitive dissonance, when the declared objectives are fundamentally at odds with the means employed and their real intentions. Simply put, they were recklessly lying, knowing that if they say the truth about their real purposes, this would signify the end of their career and power. Their end could have been eased by the high intensive population of Ukraine, which during the 90's was keeping a degree of activity. In addition, the was a Soviet and Russian identity of the vast majority of the population.
Coherent nationalists who spoke from given positions before the fall of the Soviet regime comprised in Ukrainian politics of the early 90s a vanishingly small value. Stepan Khmara, Levko Lukyanenko, Vyacheslav Chornovol , brothers Goryn – these were perhaps all their leaders. Organizations like the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and the Ukrainian People's Self-Defense (UNSO) were marginal and small. "People's Movement of Ukraine for Perestroika reforms)", even transformed into "People's Movement of Ukraine", and presented itself as a broad democratic movement (albeit with a national tinge). Prior to the structuring of the party it was an amorphous political union in which the radical nationalist sided with with former communist opportunists (like Yavoriv or Pavlychko), as well as the liberal intelligentsia.
This voters did not support nationalists who were gaining at the elections 20-25% of votes (of the national average). Real support for nationalist political forces were only at thee three Galician areas (Lviv, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivsk). In other regions, even in western Ukraine, they collected less than 50% of the vote, and in the areas of Novorossia - no more than 5-10%. In such circumstances, the nationalists had to either leave in marginal opposition without any prospects or find a strong ally. And they have found the ally.
Former Party and State leaders of the USSR, having forsaken their past for the conservation of their posts, at this time were in search of an ideology that would justify their right to rule. They have left the communist rhetoric and rhetoric of the new integration of "brotherly Russian people" as well frightened them. They believed that the restoration of a unified state will lead to a restoration of Moscow's control over provincial elites and severely limit their ability to dispose of concentrated ownership in Ukraine, including the former unified body. To some extent a cruel joke with Ukraine played its inherited wealth of the USSR. It appeared as if it was inexhaustible and the Ukrainian elite was concerned about its protection from former colleagues who have received much less. Any integration initiatives were not perceived as an attempt to establish advantageous interaction to all complementary economies, but as an attack on the neighboring republic elites inherited the Ukrainian elite Good.
Here are the objective interests of Ukrainian communist party coincided range and Ukrainian nationalists. Ukrainian nationalists wanted to build a non-Russian state in a Russian country (which Ukraine practically was in the beginning of the 90's). The former top communist party needed their own state to guarantee its right to a robbery of territory inherited from the Soviet Union. Moreover, since the integration processes in the post-Soviet space could not have not been tied to Moscow (the traditional political center + territory, combining European and Asian republics + unlimited raw material resources), Russia became an objective enemy of the nationalists and the state bureaucracy. Hence the relevance of the myth of the eternally oppressed peoples who fought for centuries (of course, with Russia) for their freedom. Herein too, was born the myth of European integration as the direction and the development of Ukraine. At the same time reality of European integration projects did not scare the Ukrainian politicians: the main line was to justify the refusal to participate in post-Soviet integration projects, specifying a different direction.
The bureaucrats and nationalists really managed to push back the influential left (socialists and communists) in the definition of public policy. Here played a role the career considerations and squabbles between the leaders of the Communist Party and the Socialist Party, and control the power of the state apparatus, and some of the frustration of the population regarding the leftist ideology (following the collapse of the Union). As a result, the bureaucrats took control of the economy , finance and the ability to seamlessly selfenrich while nationalists were given the sphere of culture, science, and education. Russia did not intervene in these processes, nor had a chance to intervene by itself.
For twenty years, nationalists were treating by their the ideological spirit two entire generations of students , they took the introduction of nationalist ideologues everywhere presupposes the existence of some educational structure including the army, the structure of the Interior Ministry, Security Service and power structures.
Initially, Ukrainian nationalism was fed in a soft version. In particular, before the end of the 90's nationalists recognized the ambiguity of the practice Bandera Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), separating it from the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) as a purely political organization, they even publicly denounced the activities during the Second World War the battalions "Roland" "Nachtigall", SS division "Galicia", schutzmannschaft-battalions manned by Ukrainian nationalists. Then there could be no question of recognizing Bandera and Shukhevych as heroes of Ukraine or even as positive figures.
Only gradually, with access to the political arena of the new generations, the emphasis changed. This was facilitated by the fact that Russia, immersed in the solution of internal problems, refused to fight for the Ukrainian information space. By the mid-90s Ukraine all ousted Russian TV channels, and by the end of 90th - the beginning of the 2000s Russian publications. Ukrainian propaganda machine, not too effective and devoid of intellectual component, in an information monopoly proved to be quite effective. Of course, anyone could quite easily get alternative information, but in fact most of the population the political news always gets the most out of the available sources.
Gradually, Ukrainian nationalism turned very violent. "Civilized" nationalists since the beginning of the 2000s (before Yushchenko) stopped ostentatiously to turn up their noses from Nazi militants. They quickly found an excuse for radical fringe. It turned out the militants because that neo-nazis are offended the Soviet statues are still conserved, and due to the fact that a large part of the population celebrates May 9th, speaks in Russian, and is not in a hurry to recognize Bandera bandits as heroes.
At some point in the early 2000s, the bureaucracy, concerned about the undermining of the social base of the Left by the privatization (in Russia there were similar processes), gave birth to the oligarchy. Now not only the bureaucrats appointed millionaires, but billionaires were buying the whole factions, ministers, prime ministers and presidents. Bureaucratic-nationalist consensus was replaced by consensus of oligarchs and nationalists, to the same time the situation in grew to a point to show the West (especially the United States) a time to intervene. It is possible that if the Ukrainian elite did not choose the anti-Russian course, the West would not dare to go to the direct interference and to brutal pressure. However, Ukraine is too long sought to break away from Russia, to eradicate all Russian influence, too zealously nurtured the most Russophobic, the darkest forces that it would goes unnoticed and unexploited.
In addition, since the beginning of the 2000s with the change of president, Russia has become more and more guided by national interests and not on abstract "universal" values. The policy objectively clashed in conflict with American interests and anti-Russian Ukraine represented to Washington a rather effective deterrent to Russia. There is nothing surprising in the fact that the United States have relied on the force, represented by the oligarchic-nationalist consensus, and now fully control the Ukrainian policy (regardless of the formal inter-party struggle, and even hatred), the more that these forces were Russophobic not only by conviction but, more important, pursued their personal mercantile interests.
On the role of the United States and "Western partners" from the EU we will discuss in the next part of the article.
