TTP & ISKP – Two Sides of the Same Coin

For over two decades, Pakistan has been embroiled in a battle against groups that cloak their violent actions in religious rhetoric. Among the most notorious of these are TTP and ISKP. Though these groups present themselves as distinct entities, they are two sides of the same coin—both driven by a Khawariji ideology that has been declared un-Islamic by religious scholars. The relationship between TTP and ISKP goes beyond ideological alignment. While each group may superficially claim a unique identity, their origins and leadership have substantial overlap. The first leader of ISKP, Hafiz Saeed Khan, was previously a well-known TTP commander from Pakistan’s Orakzai agency. This connection extends beyond individual members; TTP and ISKP share personnel, tactics, targets, and objectives, leading experts to believe that they are, in essence, two fronts of the same battle against Pakistan.

The nexus between these groups extends to their operations and resources. Both TTP and ISKP have found refuge in Afghanistan, where they enjoy safe havens free from conflict with one another, despite their alleged rivalry. While ISKP openly criticizes the Afghan Taliban and has clashed with them physically, it maintains a strangely neutral or even supportive stance toward TTP. This relationship suggests that ISKP and TTP are cooperating at some level, creating a perception that TTP may be using ISKP to deceive and divide Pakistani authorities and the public.

The ideological foundation of both TTP and ISKP can be traced back to Khawarijism, a sect that emerged in early Islamic history and was known for its extreme and uncompromising views. The Khawariji ideology advocates the use of violence against Muslims who do not adhere to their narrow interpretation of Islam, labeling them as infidels. This ideology has been denounced by Islamic scholars around the world, including those in Pakistan, who have deemed it un-Islamic and “haram” (forbidden). The Paigham-e-Pakistan fatwa, endorsed by Pakistani scholars from various sects, specifically condemns the actions of groups like TTP and ISKP as haram, asserting that armed struggle within Pakistan is fundamentally against Islamic principles.

Yet, TTP and ISKP continue to exploit religion to radicalize young, impressionable minds. They employ twisted interpretations of Islamic teachings to justify heinous acts of terrorism, targeting civilians, religious scholars, mosques, and schools. While these groups claim to fight in the name of Islam, their actions reveal the opposite. They engage in acts of brutality that Islam explicitly condemns, including suicide bombings, which are forbidden in Islamic jurisprudence. Their manipulation of youth into carrying out suicide missions further highlights the hypocrisy and moral bankruptcy of their cause; while young recruits are encouraged to sacrifice their lives, the leaders of these groups rarely, if ever, take such risks themselves.

Another factor that binds TTP and ISKP is their role as foreign proxies. Their operational activities and financial resources are largely derived from external sources that have vested interests in destabilizing Pakistan. These foreign backers use these groups to further their own agendas, effectively making TTP and ISKP puppets in a larger geopolitical game. This aspect of their existence further distances them from any legitimate claim to Islamic principles, revealing their true motivations: serving foreign powers rather than pursuing any genuine religious or nationalistic cause.

Both TTP and ISKP have been linked to foreign intelligence agencies, which use them to create unrest and destabilize Pakistan. By attacking both civilian and military targets within Pakistan, they attempt to sow fear, undermine public morale, and create an environment of instability. Their continuous efforts to destabilize Pakistan serve only to benefit their foreign handlers, further highlighting the role of these groups as pawns in a broader regional struggle.

While TTP and ISKP may appear to target different groups, this distinction is strategic rather than genuine. TTP focuses on security forces, claiming its attacks as part of a “legitimate” struggle, while ISKP has been known to attack religious gatherings, mosques, and scholars. This tactic serves to deflect public anger from TTP by allowing ISKP to take the blame for civilian-targeted violence. In this way, the TTP presents itself as a group focused solely on attacking state security apparatuses, while ISKP assumes the role of attacking “soft” targets like religious institutions. This tactic of “good cop, bad cop” allows them to maintain public confusion, diminishing a unified response against their terrorism.

Furthermore, the TTP’s use of ISKP as a proxy allows them to deflect blame and manage public backlash in Pakistan. Whenever a particularly heinous act of terrorism occurs, ISKP often claims responsibility, distancing TTP from the outrage and condemnation that follows. This tactical divide is evidence of their strategic collaboration, and it underscores their shared goal of destabilizing Pakistan through different methods of terror.

In sum, TTP and ISKP are two sides of the same coin, sharing a common Khawariji ideology and serving foreign interests in their campaign of terror against Pakistan. Their superficial distinctions are a tactical ploy to deceive the public and divert attention from their unified goal: the destabilization of Pakistan through un-Islamic acts of violence. The only way forward is a combined effort from Pakistan’s government, military, and religious scholars to expose these groups for what they are—agents of destruction who have no legitimate claim to Islam or its teachings. By building on the Paigham-e-Pakistan fatwa and fostering public awareness, Pakistan can work towards eradicating these threats and securing a peaceful future for all its citizens.