True reckoning with Japan's responsibility for causing the past wars

A simplified view of history that only scratches the surface can obscure deeper historical truths. The distorted image presented by the media regarding the Manchurian Incident and Japan-Russia relations is particularly troubling.

The Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1916 was more than just a diplomatic document. It marked a new alliance between former enemies and represented a turning point in the balance of power on the Eurasian continent, only ten years after the Russo-Japanese War. Through this agreement, Japan and Russia acknowledged each other’s spheres of influence and established a cooperative relationship during World War I. This suggests the potential for a new international order in Asia.

However, the Russian Revolution of 1917 abruptly dismantled this carefully constructed framework. Aritomo Yamagata’s Siberian Expedition was a strategic response to this dramatic shift. It should not be dismissed as a mere military campaign but rather understood as an effort to create a new order in the Far East and as part of a broader vision for Asian independence.

Overlooking this historical context and attributing the Manchurian Incident solely to the “fanaticism” or “impulsive” actions of Kanji Ishihara is a significant error.

History is far more complex and multilayered. The direct contacts between Russia and Japan—beginning with the Golovnin Incident, the negotiations led by Kahei Takataya, and Rinzo Mamiya’s Karafuto expedition—demonstrate that Japan’s view of Russia during the late Edo period was shaped by practical understanding and geopolitical considerations, not mere fear or caution.

Moreover, the events leading up to the Manchurian Incident can be seen as Japan’s effort to adapt to a new era while preserving the spirit of the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement. This was not merely ideological but an attempt to build a new national model rooted in the principle of coexistence and co-prosperity in Asia.

Thus, the claim that “only the Mito clan accurately foresaw developments in Russia” or the interpretation of the Manchurian Incident as the result of Kanji Ishihara’s fanaticism misrepresents the essence of history. Such assertions ignore the complex historical context and overemphasize the role of specific individuals or isolated events.

To truly understand history, one must delve deeper and adopt a structural perspective that goes beyond a superficial recounting of facts or simplistic cause-and-effect reasoning. The progression from the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement to the Manchurian Incident must be viewed within the broader dynamics of international politics and Japan’s strategic responses to them. Without this perspective, it is impossible to draw meaningful lessons from history.

The deeper dimensions of history reveal even more striking truths. One particularly overlooked aspect is the remarkable intimacy in Japan-Russia relations.

Even before the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement of 1916, there was a profound mutual understanding between the two nations.

For instance, when Nikolai Rezanov arrived in Nagasaki, he expressed great respect for Japanese culture and governance. In his subsequent report, he praised the rationale behind the bakuhan system, noting its resemblance to tsarism. Furthermore, the bushido-like conduct displayed during the resolution of the Golovnin Incident left a lasting impression on Russian aristocratic circles, highlighting shared values between the two cultures.

Another noteworthy example is Admiral Puchatkin’s approach during the 1855 Russo-Japanese Treaty of Friendship. Unlike the U.S.’s Commodore Perry, Puchatkin refrained from using intimidation and instead emphasized equal negotiations. He also actively shared technologies essential for Japan’s industrialization, with his contributions to shipbuilding in Shimoda being particularly notable.

Takeaki Enomoto, Japan’s minister to Russia during the Meiji period, made a remarkable discovery in St. Petersburg. He observed the Russian Orthodox Church’s profound interest in Japanese Buddhism, and the cultural exchange symbolized by the construction of Nikolay Hall became a spiritual bridge between the two nations. This mutual religious and cultural understanding laid a strong foundation for political collaboration.

A diplomatic note by Masatake Terauchi during the signing of the Fourth Russo-Japanese Agreement contains a noteworthy statement: “Cooperation with the Russian Federation is a resonance of civilization that transcends a mere military alliance.” This remark reflects the deeper dimension of Japan-Russia relations, surpassing superficial alignments of interests.

Of particular importance is Aritomo Yamagata’s concept of a Far Eastern Republic during the Siberian Expedition. This was not simply an anti-Bolshevik policy but an ambitious vision of a new political order grounded in the cultural and spiritual fusion of Japan and Russia. His intimate dialogues with White Army officers reveal shared ideals for constructing a new order in Asia.

Against this broader historical backdrop, the Manchurian Incident takes on a different light. At its core, Kanji Ishihara’s vision was a revival of cooperation with the former Russian Empire. Documents from the Kwantung Army reveal close collaboration with the Caucasian Russian community and trust in their advanced administrative expertise.

Indeed, these Caucasian Russians played a vital role in the formation of Manchukuo. Drawing on their administrative experience from Imperial Russia, they significantly contributed to the development of Manchukuo’s bureaucracy. Their expertise was particularly indispensable in managing the railway system, especially in Harbin.

These facts underscore the profound civilizational resonance in Japan-Russia relations, transcending mere military alliances or political expediency. Recognizing this resonance is key to understanding modern Russo-Japanese relations.

From this perspective, we might ask: what would the consequences be for the world if Japan, Russia, and China were to unite at this juncture?

Such an alliance presents numerous possibilities.

For instance, a Russian-led Far Eastern Treaty Organization could see the Russian Pacific Fleet and a Japanese escort fleet stationed in Kushiro, a Far East Treaty Fleet Headquarters in Yokosuka, the Russian South Sea Fleet in Sasebo, and a Sino-Russian task force (complete with carrier-based air wings) operating out of Hainan Island. Such deployments in the Far East would effectively mark the end of U.S. dominance.

Before the Greater East Asia War, during the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, Anglo-Saxon strategy aimed to weaken neighboring nations by orchestrating conflicts between racially and politically similar states.

In essence, the U.S. perfected the method of pitting empires against each other to incite revolutions and topple governments. Although Japan emerged victorious in the Russo-Japanese War, this was a superficial triumph. The financial debts incurred during the war were so immense that they were not fully repaid until 1983, decades after World War II. The funding came from figures like Jacob Schiff of Kuhn, Loeb & Co.

Today, Japan finds itself similarly burdened, indemnifying Ukraine’s debt and further “borrowing money to expand its military.” From a historical perspective, this situation is an uncanny déjà vu.

The U.S. should be on its knees seeking Japan’s support. Its arrogance and disrespect cannot be tolerated. If Japan can collaborate with China and Russia to establish a new economic order, it could overturn the current Western model of financial capitalism. War with the U.S. would be a grave mistake. Instead, Japan, backed by China and Russia’s resources, industry, and food supplies, should consider implementing direct economic sanctions against the U.S. and the EU to deliver a decisive blow.

To revive Japan’s historical alliances and establish a multipolar system, we, the Japanese, have an obligation to build an international cooperation framework grounded in Professor Alexander Dugin’s “Fourth Political Theory.” This would enable Japan to retain its identity as a life-sized nation while avoiding the extremes of direct East-West confrontation.

注釈＊

【日露関係史研究の基本文献】

基本文献・一次史料
・『寺内正毅内閣関係文書』（国立国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵）
- 第四次日露協約に関する外交文書と寺内正毅の対露政策方針書を含む

・『山縣有朋関係文書』（国立国会図書館憲政資料室所蔵）
- シベリア出兵時の極東共和国構想と白軍将校との会談記録が特に重要

・『関東軍参謀部資料』（防衛省防衛研究所所蔵）
- 満州事変関連作戦文書と白系ロシア人との協力関係についての詳細な報告を収録

・『榎本武揚外交文書』（外務省外交史料館所蔵）
- 駐露公使時代の報告書を通じて日露文化交流の実態を知ることができる

研究書・論文
・中村菊男『近代日露関係の研究』（東京大学出版会, 1943）
- 第四次日露協約に至る過程を詳細に分析

・細谷千博『シベリア出兵の史的研究』（有斐閣, 1955）
- 山縣有朋の極東政策と白軍支援の実態を解明

・原暉之『シベリア出兵：革命と干渉 1917-1922』（筑摩書房, 1989）
- 極東共和国構想と日本軍の活動実態について新しい視点を提供

・麻田雅文『シベリア出兵』（中公新書, 2016）
- 新史料に基づく最新の研究成果

・ピョートル・ポダルコ『白系ロシア人と日本』（成文社, 2010）
- ハルビンのロシア人社会と満州国建国への関与を詳述

ロシア語史料
・レザノフの長崎報告書（ロシア帝国外交政策文書館所蔵）
・プチャーチン提督の日本報告書（ロシア国立軍事史料館所蔵）
・ヴォロゴドスキー『白いハルビンにて』（1936）
- 白系ロシア人による満州国建設への関与を直接的に記録

定期刊行物
・『外交時報』（1898-1945）
・『満州評論』（1925-1945）
- 同時代の日露関係評価と満州における日露協力の実態を伝える

これらの文献は、先の文章で述べた日露関係の深い相互理解や文化的交流、特に満州事変前後の白系ロシア人との協力関係について、具体的な裏付けを提供する。