Results of 2017: The Middle East

In general

The situation in the Middle East has changed radically and, apparently, irreversibly in 2017. This mainly concerns the situation in Syria and Iraq (the victory of Assad and his allies over ISIS, an organisation that is banned in Russia), on the basis of which we can draw a conclusion about the definitive failure of American policy in the region (the end of the ‘Greater Middle East’ project) and the appearance of the new Moscow – Ankara – Teheran strategic triangle.  

Syria

In Syria, which functions as a screen and geopolitical hologram for the entire Middle East, a principle breaking point was reached in 2017: Assad’s forces (with support from Moscow, Iran, and Hezbollah) managed to cripplingly damage the radical Islamists and armed opposition and regain control over a significant part of Syrian territory. Truly, despite all the unprecedented pressure from the US, EU, and local Atlanticist proxies (Saudi Arabia, the Emirates etc., who were finally abandoned by Turkey in 2017), Putin and Teheran managed to keep supporting Assad and save Syria from the fate of Libya or Iraq.  

This victory in Syria (although it isn’t final: Islamists and the armed opposition still control several regions as before, the question of the country’s political future isn’t solved especially as far as the Kurds are concerned, as well as the situation with the Turkish-controlled territories in the north and around Idlib) is nonetheless turning around the rules of the world order. The world is no longer unipolar, and the US and its supporting geopolitical vassals are incapable of single-handedly dictating which rulers should leave and which should stay. This means that Russia’s role in the region has grown by a colossal degree, which is manifesting itself in influence on all geopolitical zones. If Russia has managed to create a political coalition that is capable of effectively withstanding the globalists and Atlanticists and it has been strengthened by military-strategic achievements, then it will be possible to repeat this feat in different geopolitical theatres, in the Islamic world and beyond.

‘Three Empires’

The most important result of 2017 has been Russia’s creation of a trilateral alliance between Moscow, Ankara, and Teheran. Teheran has started to move away from Washington after Trump, as the attempt to get closer to Teheran was a part of Obama’s strategy. Teheran now has only Moscow left among the big players, although there were strategic ties between the two countries before. Erdogan’s turn to Russia, which has begun in 2016, has reached a new level of preparation towards strategic partnership in 2017 (the purchase of the S-400 system and other signs). Putin’s regular talks with Erdogan have made it possible to build a common strategy in the north of Syria. On the other hand, Putin has eased a tense alliance with the Shi’a, most of all with Iran, but with Hezbollah and the Shi’a government of Iraq as well.

Turkey

Turkey has survived a critical moment in 2017, but Erdogan has managed to keep and even strengthen his power through the referendum. Essentially, the country has found itself in a new political situation where it needs the creation of a new ideology, as all the predecessors (Kemalism, Islamism, liberalism, and neo-Osmanism) have all run their course. The whole year round the political community has been cleansing itself of the Gülenist network, i.e. of the Atlanticist base of influence. In addition, relations between Ankara and Washington (and Brussels as well) have continuously gotten worse, which has forced Erdogan to become closer and closer to Russia.

Iran

In 2017, it has been possible for Iran to see the results of its measured and steadfast policy, which is oriented on the strengthening of Shi’a identity and regional sovereignty. In addition, the position of the strongest supporters of rapprochement with the US, which was supported under Obama, has markedly declined under Trump, who has made Iranophobia a part of his Middle Eastern policy. This has strengthened the position of Iranian conservatives and has only made Teheran move even closer to Moscow. Support for Assad and opposition towards Saudi Arabia have also been successful.  

The Kurds

In such a situation, the last argument of the US have become the Kurds, who could very well have become the hardest issue to solve for all powers in the region: Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran. But, as far as this question is concerned, a breaking point was reached in 2017: no one supported the referendum in Iraqi Kurdistan, Kirkuk has come under the control of the Shiites in Bagdad (in agreement with Talabani and with a passive US watching on), and US support for the Syrian Kurds has also strongly diminished; this last group faced the coalition alone and started to look for ways to get nearer to Russia (the only country that is not under threat from the Kurds).  

Iraq

The situation in Iraq in 2017 has changed significantly. Although the Kurds held a referendum about independence and have tried to hold their partial control over Kirkuk, the situation did not end in a direct confrontation. In addition, Assad’s victory in Syria with the support of Russia and Iran has substantially influenced the position of the Iraqi Shiites as well, who earlier had to continuously face strong pressure directly from Iraqi Salafist Sunni’s and ISIS. The strengthening of Assad and the strong weakening of the Saudi’s in Syria has tipped the balance in favour of the Shiite south, which both the Americans and the Sunni’s were forced to acknowledge; the latter have started to grow nearer to Bagdad to effect a political solution of the current situation.   

The taking of Mosul by the Americans has only helped to strengthen Bagdad’s position, which, in addition, isn’t itself loyal to the Americans and is orientated more towards Teheran. As Russia stood at the centre of the radical shift in the balance of power in the region, Moscow’s role has grown in the eyes of the Iraqi leadership as well. However, a full strengthening of Russian-Iraqi relations did not take place. In addition, the successes in Syria have made Shi’a Islam an even more important factor, which has forced many Islamic organisations to re-examine their relations with the Shi’a in general; this was earlier impossible due to the deep Shi’aphobia of the Wahhabis and Salafis, but it is fully possible for traditional (mainly Sufi) Islam.

Qatar

In parallel to this, disregarding Trump’s visit to Saudi Arabia with the goal of strengthening the pro-American coalition, and perhaps thanks to this visit, the influential country of Qatar has moved away from the Salafi block, which has for a long time had a series of disagreements with Riyad. Qatar has started an unequivocal rapprochement with Turkey, Iran, and Russia, i.e. with the new strategic triangle (the ‘Three Empires’). Attempts by the Saudi’s and the Americans to smother Qatar with a blockade have failed and another influential regional player, which has provided support to many Salafi structures (most importantly the ‘Muslim Brotherhood’), finds itself opposing the Atlanticists.

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia, too, has not stayed on the side-lines of this process. The Saudi king has visited Moscow and even received a promise about the delivery of the S-400, which has struck a blow against Saudi-American ties. In addition, prince Salman has begun an internal purge of the royal house, which has injected an element of destabilisation in Saudi internal politics. To all this, a new wave of attacks by the Yemeni Shiites (Houthi’s) can be added; the Shiites have become bolder, because they detected a serious breach between in the camp of their enemies the Salafis. Finally, Trump’s decision to recognise Jerusalem as Israel’s capital has decisively disturbed the Saudi position, as this act has shown the insignificance of the Arab factor in Trump’s eyes and the rightness of the Shiites, who have consistently represented anti-Zionist positions.

Libya

All this has affected the situation in Libya, where the main political and military forces have actively started to seek contact with Russia: convinced that the US and EU cannot give them any substantial support, they have all at once decided to play the Russian card. This also concerns general Khaftar’s (Tobruk) visit to Moscow, the constant messages from Fayez al-Sarraj (Tripoli), and the appearance on the political scene of Saif al-Islam Khaddaffi, the son of the historical leader of Libya who was killed with US and EU backing. 

Russia’s influence in the region has grown so much, that towards the end of 2017 all prerequisites for more substantial Russian involvement in Libyan politics are in place. What is more, Russia is acting as a part of the ‘Three Empires’ triangle, which, including Qatar and neutral Egypt, makes it a force to be reckoned with.  

Jordan

Jordan has very vulnerable positions in its relations with America. A significant amount of Jordan’s budget depends on American monetary infusions, and this has a noticeable influence on Jordan’s domestic and foreign policy. The ‘Muslim Brothers’ are specifically based in Jordan, and Abdullah II bin al-Hussein acknowledges that he can’t lay so much as a finger on them: they are directed by the CIA.  

Egypt

Egypt has not been the centre of attention in 2017, but the country has attentively followed the movement of the balance of power, which has led to an offer to Russia to build a military base in Egypt. This means that Cairo too is beautifully acknowledging the logic of geopolitical trends and is looking for a rapprochement with Russia. This is especially relevant considering potential Russian involvement in the process of building order in Libya.

Israel

Israel has conducted fairly effective policy in 2017, having achieved an important for the Israeli’s acknowledgement of Jerusalem as the country’s capital. Netanyahu has also fairly accurately built policy in relation to Moscow, avoiding direct confrontations and ignoring Moscow’s support for Iran, which is Israel’s main opponent. In general, the strengthening of Wahhabism and Salafism in the region was in Israel’s favour as it blocked the Iranians and Shi’a. And even though Assad wasn’t a specific Israeli goal, his strengthening doesn’t bode anything well for them.  America and Trump’s support for Israel is secured as it was under other American presidents, but in a regional context the country’s position has become shakier. If the American states continue to build an anti-American alliance (in essence, not in name only), Israel will face a critical situation which it had earlier avoided by provoking internal conflict in its neighbours.

Yemen

In 2017 Yemen has continued to be torn by bloody conflicts. Towards the end of the year former president Ali Abdallah Saleh was killed; he had earlier been a Houthi ally. In general, the Houthi have been able to secure and keep their positions despite direct Saudi intervention. What is more, they have managed to strike back multiple times, even reaching the outskirts of Riyad at times.  

Essentially, the US backed starting a war against the Houthi. It was them that pushed the Saudi leadership towards the start of military operations and the creation of an Islamic coalition. In many aspects, this was calculated to pressure Iran. 

Among other things, there was another large miscalculation from the side of Saudi Arabia, which decided to keep the Houthi’s opponents in power by way of military force. This is impossible. Egypt’s opposition was telling, as the country usually supports Saudi Arabia; however, Egypt showed restraint towards Yemen and refused to send its military.  

Lebanon

In 2017, Lebanon showed a strengthening of Hezbollah’s position and a weakening of several hotbeds of radical Salafism. Hezbollah confirmed its status as the most important force in the region, having bolstered its position in Lebanon as well as in Syria, having essentially become the military vanguard of the whole Syrian army. Lebanon’s prime minister Saad Hariri was practically taken hostage by Saudi Arabia, where the Americans and Saudi’s blackmailed him into leaving his post. In the end he managed to return to Lebanon.

It is likely that Hariri’s capture and the attempt to force him to leave office was undertaken by the Americans in agreement with Israel, which had planned to escalate violence in Lebanon. Because of several reasons this plan failed and Hariri was released to Beirut. Lebanon is the next target for destabilisation the situation in the Middle East.  

Translated from the Russian by V.A.V.