Regarding the denunciation of the Contract on RASR. Part II.

Part I

 4. The analysis of motives for possible denunciation of the Contract on RASR

The expert community provides the following reasons for Russia’s favorability of denouncing the Contract on RASR.

1. The group of rockets of average and smaller range can become the important instrument of regional control in modern geostrategic conditions.

2. The group of rockets of average and smaller range can be used to counteract the regional American system of the global AMD.

3. A situation when participants of the Contract on RASR comprise only a small number of world states, and other nations have the right to create rockets of average and smaller range for needs of their own defense – this clearly constitutes discrimination in relation to the participants of the contract.

4. In recent years, the United States regularly violated the Contract on RASR.

5. The contract on RASR lost its prior military-political meaning, and so the revision of the system of international treaties on European safety is necessary.

According to some experts, Russia is justified in leaving the Contract on RASR because the reasons its inclusion are not put forward in absolute terms. Meaning, there are no substantial reasons and/or pretexts to justify the Contract on RASR.

According to other experts, on the contrary, these reasons are closely connected and mutually supplemental to each other.

Let's analyze in more detail the possible reasons for the denunciation of the Contract on RASR by Russia.

4.1. The group of rockets of average and smaller range can become the important instrument of regional control in modern geostrategic conditions

 In fact, this constitutes the main argument for Russia’s exit from the Contract on RASR. After all, the exit from this agreement is not meaningful if Russia does not plan to create the missile systems forbidden to them.

For more than two decades our country went without rockets of average and smaller range of land basing. Lately, however, the situation drastically changed.

Despite a decrease in the probability of a global war, there have been new threats lining up in close proximity to Russia’s borders, which represent a real threat to Russian national security.

Among these threats, NATO is advancing East – this constitutes an essential change which is detrimental to Russian security because it threatens the peace-time ratios of Russian armed forces. China is another concern – which has been intensifying its military capabilities via nuclear weapons and creating better means of rocket delivery. This has also been true of a number of other states bordering Russia – a situation aggravating the frontier regions and intensifying the possibility of international terrorism.

Let's pay attention to these new threats – threats on a regional level. In addition, at the intercontinental level, global control continues to be provided with the Russian SNW.

Let's also pay attention that for other parties connected to the Contract on RASR, such as the United States, similar regional threats of safety do not exist.

With the changing geostrategic conditions our country has experienced since the end of the Cold War, we could consider that a group of rockets of average (first of all) and smaller range could be important additional instruments of regional protection, used as a counterbalance to the superiority in number of the armies and conventional arms of the countries of NATO, as well as some other the states.

And if the majority of experts are in agreement on the question of the existence of regional threats to the safety of the Russian Federation, then on the question of threat prevention, the expert community was nevertheless divided.

Supporters of maintaining the Contract on RASR believe that for preventing the increase of average range threats, the available Russian intercontinental missiles – which provide nuclear control on all operational directions and ranges without rockets of average range – are sufficient.

In addition for the prevention of probable regional threats (except SNW) it cannot be used on strategic (front or tactical) aircraft, nor can rockets be used against the coastal countries via ships and submarines. Nonetheless, for national defense Russia also develops its aerospace capabilities.

In case these forces will be insufficient for preventing regional threats, the further development of additional IBM is suggested. According to supporters of this approach, all this will keep new Contract ceilings (700 carriers and 1550 warheads) within SOA with a large supply – this will not conflict with the existing limits imposed by the Contract RASR.

To justify this position, the argument is made that a wide-ranging intercontinental delivery system is a more universal weapon of protection in comparison with rockets of average range. For example, the same IBM can strike blows to the truncated trajectories of average range systems.

An advantage of this approach is also the reduction of the number of different types of rockets being produced.

The essential expenses necessary for the development of new rockets of average range are also noted.

Conversely, the supporters of the denunciation of the Contract on RASR believe that land rockets of average range are the most expedient for protection against regional threats.

Thus, part of the tasks assigned earlier to the SNW group (and relating to the Eurasian landmass) can be redistributed among the RAR perspective group.

After all, a portion of the IBM at average range reduces the potential of retaliation of SNW on an opposing force’s objects of intercontinental range. It is also impossible to exclude that, under the existing international legal restrictions of the SOA, the expansion of America’s AMD global system and the increase in threats to Russia at average range – all these factors increase the probability that the domestic SNW will be insufficient for the nuclear protection of Russia in all directions and at all ranges.

It should also be known that the Contract on RASR forbids nuclear rockets of average range to be used not only for the solution of regional problems but also for the solution of specific fighting objectives in conflicts of a regional scale on Russia’s borders. The application of such means could affect the outcome of operations.

On the question of cost for the reconstruction of rockets of average and smaller range, this demands careful economic analysis. Previously it was possible to assume that such expenses would not be very expensive for the domestic economy. After all, it is obvious that the development of new missile systems of average and smaller range can be conducted on the basis of the already created and fulfilled arms (Topol family and operational and tactical missile system "Iskander" IBM). This is available on both a scientific and production basis.

The formation of specific fighting objectives and options quantitative and qualitative groups of rockets of average and smaller range should be carried out on the basis of the detailed analysis of potential regional threats to the Russian Federation.

We will carry out only a short preliminary analysis of such threats below.

The potential Western threat to Russian national security is defined by an essential superiority of NATO’s armed forces (both quantitatively and qualitatively) in relation to the armed forces of Russia. Let's remind the reader that at the signing of the Contract on RASR the situation was reverse – i.e. the USSR and the Warsaw Pact was superior to NATO in military capability.

The further expansion of NATO to the East only strengthens an imbalance of forces between the alliance and Russia. Thus there are fears that the large contingents of armed forces of NATO can be placed in the territory of her new members in close proximity to the borders of Russia. Another serious fear in connection with the expansion of NATO is the essential increase of NATO’s long-range arms which can destroy major Russian targets.

Despite the official declaration of partnership between Russia and NATO, contradictions in questions of ensuring mutual safety are yet to be resolved. A key aspect of the military strategy of NATO is in carrying out its policy of security from an aggressive position of greater force – i.e. NATO’s strategic installations officially allow the possibility of the application of its military force outside of the North Atlantic geographical zone.

The North Atlantic alliance’s forcing of hostilities between Europe and Russia can be considered improbable. However NATO can still try to use its military force on Russian territory in case of an aggravation of any ethno-confessional conflict.

Another way Russia can be involved in a military conflict with NATO can be connected with the emergence of a crisis situation in the area “between Russia and NATO” (Ukraine, Pridnestrovye, Transcaucasia, etc.). Such a situation can become the precondition for the possible intervention of neighboring NATO countries and Russia’s direct involvement in the conflict. Thus, the existence of powerful armies in the immediate regions bordering Russia can provoke armed actions on a large-scale.

The military-political situation in the Far East is formed under the influence of strengthening the international position of China and amplifying the rivalry for a repartition of spheres of influence in the Asian and Pacific region.

Despite the small probability of the application of military force against Russia in this region, local conflicts of varying intensity can still arise which can infringe on the interests of Russia. In the future, the possibility of large-scale conflicts is therefore not excluded. Situations which can potentially destabilize Russia include the ongoing Taiwanese and Korean problems.

Despite a considerable improvement in Sino-Russian relations in recent years, it would be wrong not to be ever mindful of the increasing political clout of China – specifically, its growing economic power and future military potential. A possible change in Chinese foreign policy can create future potential threats to the interests of Russia in the region and to Russia’s own territorial integrity. These threats can come as a result of any number of following changes: the implementation of reforms and a change in the ratio of China’s military forces, a difficult demographic situation in China, an increase in an imbalance of the Chinese population in the frontier regions of China and Russia, etc.

At the emergence of a crisis situation in Sino-Russian bilateral relations, China can put its armed forces on alert against Russia under the pretext of protecting its national security, its interests, and the Chinese living in the Far East. In the long-term, there is also the prospect that upon the achievement of considerable advantages in economic and military areas, China can return to its former claims on Russian territories in the Far East and Siberia, which China has historically considered theirs. At the same time, considering the interest of China in the raw material resources of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and the relative weakness of the republics of the CIS, it is impossible to exclude the possibility of future Russian involvement in Chinese intervention in these states.

It should be noted that the majority of vital strategic, administrative, political and military facilities of eastern Russia are well within the reach of Chinese intercontinental ballistic missiles and BRAR. It should also be known that the RAR "Pioneer" Asian group (directed by China) was also destroyed according to the Contract on RASR.

An important influence on the regional situation is rendered also by Japan which continues to actively increase its military potential. And although Japan is not now considered a military threat to Russia, its considerable military potential and absence of a peace treaty with Russia, in addition to territorial disputes, do not stabilize the strategic situation. It is impossible to exclude the possibility that, in case of a retraction of Russia in large-scale military conflicts in the west or south, the Japanese government can go on the offensive to capture the disputed territories now controlled by Russia.

In the southwest and southern border regions it should be noted that there is an extensive belt of instability and ongoing conflicts in the Asian region (e.g. Transcaucasia, the Middle East, Central and the Southern Asia).

It is impossible to exclude the possibility that this region can become a source of threats for the safety of Russia. The most probable scenario of Russian involvement in this region is in a conflict with foreign states which meddle in the affairs of the states of the CIS (former USSR) – states with which Russia is connected by the Contract on collective security (CSTO).

So in Transcaucasia armed conflict can fuel tension between Georgia and Abkhazia, Georgia and South Ossetia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. For the localization and the termination of peacekeeping functions, Russia can use its military and, thus, become a participant in this kind of a conflict. In case of the development of the conflict into a local war, there will be a real precondition for the possible intervention of Turkey, and perhaps other NATO countries. As for other potentially dangerous areas of Central Asia, it is impossible to exclude the possibility that paramilitary groups of Islamic fundamentalists can ignite border conflict with the states of the CIS.

In addition, the distribution of nuclear weapons and rocket technologies in the Asian region has intensified in recent years. Thus the territory of Russia is located within the range of existing and prospective rocket delivery systems of a number of these Asian states.

In the foreseeable future in the Eurasian region, there can be a wide range of regional military threats to the safety of Russia, not excluding in certain conditions large-scale military aggression.

Rockets of land basing of average and smaller range can become an effective remedy for the elimination of these threats.

The following main objectives can be assigned to group the prospective domestic missile systems with ballistic RASR:

- regional nuclear control of large-scale aggression against Russia on the Eurasian continent at the expense of the possibility of inflicting an essential damage to the military-economic potential to the opponent;

- providing a de-escalation of the regional conflict on the Eurasian continent by initiating precautionary blows, allowing to strike separate objects of an opponent’s armies and military-economic potential – and at the expense of applying high-precision, non-nuclear, low-power weapons;

- suppression of large-scale aggression against Russia by defeating the army groups of the opponent and inflicting a mandatory damage to military-economic potential of the opponent;

- control of further expansion of the infrastructure of NATO in the East (first of all, preventing the expansion of nuclear delivery vehicles in the new countries of NATO adjacent to the borders of Russia) and containing the possible strengthening of Chinese army groups on Russia’s borders.

4.2. The group of rockets of average and smaller range can be used for counteraction to regional American means of the global system of AMD

 This motive for an exit of Russia from the Contract on RASR is close to the previous. After all, both of them are connected with the RASR’s group expansion in the interests of ensuring national security of the Russian Federation. The first is only concerned to counteract the shock systems of eventual opponents, and the second – to counteract defensive (in fact) AMD systems of the USA.

The created AMD system of the USA, in the long term, is capable of threatening Russian nuclear control – this proves to be the result of true organizational research of the Russian Defense Ministry.

The greatest concern of Russia is caused thus by the European segment of the AMD of the USA which means of interception will be most approached to areas of SOA of the Russian rockets.

In 2007, the George W. Bush administration in the USA sounded plans of expansion – the so-called, third item region of the strategic AMD of the USA in Europe. This consisted of 10 mine anti-rockets of distant interception of GBI in Poland and stationary RLS of support and the prompting of anti-rockets in the Czech Republic.

In 2009 the new Obama administration declared its refusal to expand the third item region of the US’s AMD in Europe. And alternatively, “The stage-by-stage adaptive approach” to the placement of antimissile systems of the USA in Europe was offered for this project new. According to this approach, the expansion of non-strategic anti-rockets of sea and land basing (of the Standart-3 family) is planned in the territory of Poland and Romania, and also by sea in the coastal areas around Europe.

According to a new approach, the development of the USA’s AMD program in Europe was planned to be carried out in four stages, through the gradual accumulation of the quantity of means of the AMD, and also through the interception of rockets – from operational and tactical, at the first stage, to intercontinental at the fourth stage.

In 2013 the USA declared its latest update of the AMD program. With reference to the European AMD it was declared that there would be changes to the fourth stage – i.e. the “Stage-by-stage adaptive approach”, which caused the greatest objections by Russia.

However, this updating of the American plans on the AMD did not remove the basic Russian concern over the European segment of the AMD.

The goal of the USA is to create, near our western borders, an advanced region of the global AMD in aggregate with the accumulation of efforts in the field of technologies of the interception of rockets on a site of their dispersal (an active site).

Military experts in the USA do not hide the belief that the main link of any option of the perspective strategic AMD is the interception and destruction over the territory of the potential opponent of SOA with regard to the selection of rockets on a site of their dispersal. In this case solutions are not required for one of the most difficult tasks in the field of the AMD – e.g. selections of warheads against hindrances and masking objects. Besides, at rocket interception on active site fragments of the destroyed nuclear warheads and means of overcoming of the AMD fall in the territory of the opponent or neighboring states.

Representatives of the military-political leadership of the USA publicly assure that the created AMD system has a limited character and does not represent any threat to the Russian nuclear capability. The official reason for the creation of the AMD system is that Washington is concerned over the activity of the nuclear missile sphere in regions surrounding the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and Iran.

It is remarkable, however, that the international arrangements reached concerning the Iranian nuclear program in November 2013, in Geneva, were not reflected in any way in plans on the creation of the European segment of the AMD. Although the U.S. President Barack Obama also declared earlier that if the Iranian threat were to be eliminated, then incentives for the creation of the AMD in Europe will disappear. However on December 16, 2013 the head of the Pentagon Chuck Hagel, during a videoconference with the Russian Minister of Defense, reported that despite the Geneva arrangements across Iran, the further construction of the AMD in Europe will not be suspended.

New information on antimissiles, in connection with events in Ukraine, is also remarkable. More frank were statements concerning the AMD which some Western politicians now openly consider as a military counterbalance to Russia, having forgotten former admonitions. And some Ukrainian politicians even declared the possibility of placing some elements of the American AMD in Ukraine.

According to experts at the independent American think-tank "Naslediye" (Heritage Foundation), the situation that has developed regarding the construction of the European AMD, in connection with the Ukrainian events, demands a thorough revision of approaches of the military-political leadership of the USA. Specialists of various American think-tanks as well as some leading American congressmen, retired high-ranking military personnel, and politicians also agree.

All these signs only confirm Russian fears - the AMD in Europe within its present plans is focused on destroying Russia’s nuclear capabilities.

In these conditions, to counteract the USA’s AMD of the USA is an actual problem of national security for Russia.

Thus along with political, diplomatic and informational measures – military and technical measures to counteract the AMD are also considered. Among them, include the destruction of AMD sites in Europe.

Such statements came from Russian officials on the highest levels.

So, the successful tests of the new R-500 cruise missile carried out in 2007 for an operational and tactical missile system of the Iskander type became, according to the President of Russia Vladimir Putin, the answer to the USA’s expansion of AMD elements in Europe.

On November 5, 2008 the President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev, in his appeal to the Federal Meeting, designated a number of possible countermeasures on the expansion of the third item region of the AMD. Among such measures included the placement in the Kaliningrad region of Russia the operational and tactical Iskander missile system.

On November 23, 2011 the President Medvedev made the statement in connection with a situation which developed around the AMD system and the countries of NATO in Europe. In it he declared the possible placement of modern shock systems which would defeat the AMD European component in the west and south of Russia. In particular he mentioned the expansion of the Iskander missile system in the Kaliningrad region.

Placed in the territory of the Kaliningrad region, the Iskander complexes have a range of trajectory of up to 500 km (which is authorized in the Contract on RASR) and are capable of blocking all the territory of Poland and of carrying out the task of destroying all American AMD objects placed there.

The Commander of the Rocket armies and artillery Overland armies of Russia declared in the press that the problem of the country’s leaders of OTRK "Iskander" will be solved by placing the rockets the Kaliningrad region and "will be carried out if needed in established periods".

As to the statement for the possible placement of OTRK "Iskander" in the south, in the expert environment the point of view expressed was that it could go from the Krasnodar Region as the closest Russian region to the AMD of the USA in Romania (the Air Force’s former base to Devesela). Now the Russian region next to Romania is the Crimea.

However, from the Krasnodar and Crimean Regions, the OTRK "Iskander" (resolved by the Contract on RASR) does not reach the territory of the USA’s AMD base in Romania.

The range of a complex can be increased, according to information provided in the mass media and among military experts. However, in this case, Russia is beyond the Contract on RASR.

Thus, for the destruction of AMD sites in Europe, rockets of average and smaller range can be used. Let's recall that the possibility of a Russian exit from the Contract on RASR as to a countermeasure on the European segment of the AMD, was declared in 2007 by the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation – Gen. Baluyevsky.

4.3. A situation when participants of the Contract on RASR are only some states of the world, and the others have the right to create rockets of average and smaller range for defense purposes, is discriminatory against participants of the contract.

 The similar argument, in particular, was voiced in a well-known speech of President Putin at the Munich conference on safety of policy issues.

Really, many states have rockets of average and smaller range on classification of the Contract on RASR – they develop and use them in ensuring the national security.

Let's recall that by the time of the signing of the Contract on RASR, France and China were the only two nations (other than the USSR and the USA) that possessed land rocket arms of average and smaller range. And France subsequently refused these systems.

Now, on an extreme measure, already seven states of the world possess rockets of land basing of average range on classification of the Contract on RASR (that is, at a range between 1000 and 5500 km). It is China, India, Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Curiously, according to official statements coming out of Washington, Iranian and North Korean rockets forced the USA to create the AMD global system.

On the classification of the Contract on RASR (i.e. at a range of 500 to 1000 km), (besides the abovementioned seven countries), Egypt, Syria, Libya, Yemen, Turkey, South Korea have rockets of smaller range.

Thus, all seven of the states with rockets of average range geographically are within reach of Russian territory (including, China, India, Israel, Pakistan - with rockets in nuclear equipment), and some of the states (China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Turkey) are capable of reaching the territory of the Russian Federation with rockets of smaller range.

According to A.Arbatov, “the groundless association in one heap of all countries having rockets of average range, impresses politicians and the public, but does not maintain the sober strategic analysis”.

Really, it is difficult to disagree with this statement. The majority of owners of the weapon of this class, at least at the present stage, hardly intend to use it against Russia. For example, India focuses its rockets on China and Pakistan, Pakistan aims its rockets against India, Israel, Iran and other Arab countries, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea tries to threaten the USA and its allies (namely South Korea and Japan). Due to the fact that political and military intentions can change, some of these countries could potentially threaten Russia in the future.

Certainly, the idea of a future competition between Russia and all such countries having rockets of average and smaller range looks absolutely far-fetched and extremely expensive.

However there is no question about it. The fact is that an increasing number of states are seizing or attempting to seize technologies of rockets of average and smaller range for the need of self-defense. The ban on them concerns only the narrowest number of the countries - the USA and assignees of the USSR under the Contract on RASR. Thus if for the USA such systems actually also are not necessary, considering the closest geographical neighbors of the USA, Russia could use them for ensuring its own safety.

4.4. The United States regularly break the Contract on RASR

 According to the Russian side, the United States regularly breaks the Contract on RASR.

Among the main Russian claims against the USA:

- use by the United States in interests of working off of AMD system of the rockets targets similar on characteristics to rockets of average and smaller range;

- production of the fighting pilotless aircraft falling under validity about RASR by the United States;

- planned expansion by the United States in Poland and Romania in a framework of “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach,” the land Mk-41 launchers capable of deploying SOA cruise missiles of average range.

According to A.Arbatov, “Russia, as it often happens, reacts to claims of the USA’s reciprocal claims”.

However here it is necessary to categorically disagree with this expert. The Russian claims against Washington in violation of the Contract on RASR started to be expressed nearly 15 years ago, long before the West’s disinformation campaign accusing Russia of violating this agreement.

4.4.1. Rocket targets

In January 2001 there was a statement made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “In the USA there is an experience of creation on the basis of the second and third steps of IBM ‘Minitmen-2’ of the rocket target of the ballistic missile of land basing of average range of the new HERA type in defiance of the Contract on RASR. The question of violations of the Contract by the United States about RASR at various levels was repeatedly put forward by the Russian side. However the satisfactory answer from the American side still did not follow’.

Subsequently official claims were repeated. So, in August 2010 the following statement was issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: “The American side systematically breaks basic provisions of the Contract on RASR, using for working off of elements of AMD system the rockets targets simulating ballistic missiles of average range, the HERA, LRALT and MRT type. According to the Contract on RASR, carrying out SOA-up of these rockets is qualified as test of ballistic missiles of land basing of average range of new type which is in violation of Article VI”.

According to the same A.Arbatov, in the Contract on RASR there is a point allowing usage of elements of rockets of average range for testing the AMD systems as targets, without intending to destroy them.

It is represented that in this case this expert is hardly right.

It is obvious that it is a question of the provision of item 3 of article VII of the Contract on RASR. Namely, “the ballistic missile of land basing of the type created and tested only for the interception of objects, not being on Earth’s surface – it is not considered that these rockets are restricted by the Contract on RASR”.

In this situation, with all evidence, it is a question of antirockets, but not about rocket targets. And the rocket target simulating the ballistic missile of average range, in fact, also is the rocket of average range, that is it is a weapon delivery system which is set on "train" during anti-rocket tests.

The certificate of that the same HERA is the ballistic missile of average range, its technical characteristics, and also use fact serve in its structure of equipment of a control system of the rocket of average range of "Pershing-2" also. Let's recall, in this regard, that Pershing-2 rockets were liquidated by a method of burning, but with preservation of instrument compartments and the subsequent dismantle of elements of a control system. As a result Americans kept devices of a control system of Pershing-2 rockets which are now used by production of rockets targets.

The United States for a legal justification qualify the rockets targets as the accelerating means resolved by the Contract on RASR. According to item 12 of article VII of the Contract on RASR “each of the parties has the right to make and use for accelerating means which otherwise could be considered as the rocket of average range or the smaller range, only existing types of accelerating steps”.

The USA really use for rockets targets of average range (HERA, LRALT and MRT) existing types of accusing steps (“Minuteman-2”, "Trident-1", "Castor").

However according to the item 12b of article VII of the Contract on RASR SOA-up of such accelerating means are not considered as flight tests of rockets of average range and smaller range provided that such accelerating means are used only with a view of researches and development for test of objects, but not accelerating means.

That is it is a question of tests of any useful loading of accelerating means, for example, for a conclusion in space or in an upper atmosphere. However in the case under consideration it does not occur. The same HERA rocket at the initial stage, as we know, in general was tested independently, that is tests of the most accelerating means were carried out. Therefore SOA-up of rockets targets of the USA also are treated by the Russian side as SOA-up of rockets of average range of new type that is direct violation of the Contract on RASR.

According to the general designer MEATH Yu.Solomonova, “Americans in defiance of the Contract on RASR actually created the rocket of average range”.

According to M. Vildanov, “causes bewilderment that violation by Americans of provisions of the Contract on RASR did not become a subject of concern of the top military-political management of the Russian Federation, a subject of meetings of heads of defensive and foreign policy departments of the Russian Federation and the USA, discussions in profile committees of the Federation Council”. He considers that “irresolute actions of the Russian side created to Americans favorable conditions for development and tests global and the EUROAMD” and that “the Russian side, in the presence of political will, could use competently violations by Americans of provisions of the Contract on RASR and demand stay of tests global and the EUROAMD to full permission of problem questions and removal of our excitement”.

Such criticism is certainly fair. Still Russia used only bilateral diplomatic format for permission of this problem. It would be necessary more persistently and to use widely multilateral international forums, to draw attention of parliaments and the public of the countries of the world, mass media (as it is done by the USA now, accusing Russia of violation of the Contract on RASR).

 4.4.2 Pilotless aircraft

Other claim of Russia to Washington concerning implementation of the Contract on RASR is test and use of shock pilotless aircraft of the corresponding range by the United States, in particular PA "Predator" range about 1000 km.

According to the Contract on RASR shock pilotless aircraft of land basing with range from 500 to 5500 km can be classified as cruise missiles of land basing of average or smaller range which are forbidden by this contract.

Reference: The term "cruise missile" means the pilotless means equipped with own propulsion system which flight on the most part of its trajectory is provided at the expense of use of aerodynamic carrying power.

The term "the cruise missile of land basing" means the cruise missile of land basing which is a weapon delivery system.

Now the USA is actively carrying out work on the creation of PA which have already proved in operations, and this all-important significance is attached. Thus if before PA were used only for investigation, during operations in Afghanistan in 2001 of PA already began to be used successfully as the weapon, that is for defeat of the land purposes.

Pilotless aircraft have a number of clear advantages over the piloted: they are smaller and more maneuverable, they consume less fuel, make essentially lower demands to airfields, do not demand life support systems and expensive preparation of pilots – thus the person can operate several crafts at the same time from the ground.

According to available open data, in the context of the Contract on RASR, Americans considered PA problem on specially created interdepartmental commission. Special meeting of National Security council under the direction of the U.S. President which approved an official position of the military-political leadership of the USA was held even. According to this position “shock PA should not be considered within the Contract on RASR as are intended for repeated application, and after performance of fighting tasks they come back to point of a constant dislocation, and cruise missiles of land basing are means of disposable action”. Further the American experts declared that “shock PA cannot be considered as cruise missiles of land basing as have no launchers”.

However such treatments do not correspond to the Contract on RASR where unequivocal definition of the term “winged rockets of land basing” is made, and PA with all evidence fall under this definition.

The American representatives, also repeatedly declared that when signing the Contract on RASR of shock PA did not exist even in projects. It the arisen legal collision also speaks.

Certainly, it is possible to agree with it. However it does not justify violation of the Contract on RASR, and demands, at least, specification of its some terms within Special control commission.

Russia as it is represented, is also interested in PA own program development.

Mk-41 launchers

In a framework of “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach” the United States plans to develop in Poland and Romania Standard-3 antirockets on land Mk-41 launchers.

However according to available data, universal Mk-41 launchers can be used both for SOA of antirockets, and for SOA of cruise missiles of average range of "Tomahawk". Therefore the land option of these launchers can be considered as direct violation of the Contract on RASR.

Let's remind that according to item 7. Article VII of the Contract about RASR “if the launcher was tested for SOA of the cruise missile of land basing, all launchers of this type are considered as tested for SOA of cruise missiles of land basing”.

And according to article VI of the Contract about RASR “each of the parties does not make any launchers of land basing of rockets of average and smaller range”.

Besides, there are suspicions that in Mk-41 launchers in Romania and Poland instead of antirockets combat cruise missiles of land basing of average range can be developed forbidden by the Contract on RASR. These rockets are capable to strike crucial and strategic objects on the European part of the territory of Russia.

Thus, the carried-out analysis showed that the United States regularly break in recent years the Contract on RASR. In these conditions as believes a number of experts, Russia has the right to raise the question about a withdrawal from a treaty about RASR. As contracts should be observed only with the diligent partner.

The truth exists also other point of view. Supporters of saving of the Contract on RASR consider that the arisen problems have technical character and can be resolved within Special control commission without denunciation of the Contract on RASR. For example, new definition of the term "cruise missile", deducing LA from the right field of the Contract on RASR can co-ordinate the parties. Or to agree about placement of antirockets in technically distinguished launchers with possibility of their inspections on places.

Let's pay thus special attention to that circumstance that the Special control commission under the Contract on RASR was not convoked more than ten years. Its last session took place in October, 2003.

4.5. The contract on RASR lost the former military-political meaning, revision of system of international treaties on safety in Europe is necessary

 The contract on RASR though consisted between leading powers of the world (the USSR and the USA) treated, first of all, the European region and had regional character.

Together with the prisoner soon after it the CCAE (Contract on conventional arms in Europe) it made the base of system of the European safety in the conditions of bipolar opposition in Europe two leading military-political blocks - the Warsaw Treaty Organizations and NATO.

The contract on RASR was urged to reduce nuclear opposition on the European continent, to reduce probability of emergence of the regional nuclear conflict and its development into global war.

The CCAE was to urge to lower opposition of groups of usual armed forces of Department of Internal Affairs and NATO, to reduce imbalances in the sphere of conventional arms and potential for implementation of sudden attack and offensive actions in Europe.

However in time a past after the conclusion of these agreements the geopolitical situation considerably changed.

The USSR - one of two parties of the Contract on RASR and one of the leading parties CCAE, heading the Warsaw Pact broke up. Stop assistance and the Warsaw Treaty Organization., which however did not lead to NATO dissolution. Moreover, some former federal republics of the USSR and the country of the Warsaw Pact in which territory for NATO control rockets of average and smaller range and the considerable contingents of usual armed forces earlier took place, are members of NATO or aspire to the accession to alliance.

A number of related issues of safety in Europe which were put even during negotiations on the Contract on RASR was not solved.

Let's remind that during negotiations on RASR the Soviet Union insisted on the account in balance of forces in Europe of nuclear means of the European countries of NATO - Great Britain and France, and also aviation nuclear means of the USA of the advanced basing of average range.

Showing readiness to make concessions at late stages of negotiations, the Soviet management, obviously, the solution of these questions in the future hoped for possibility. However it did not occur.

Now in Europe aviation not strategic arms of the USA - about 200 nuclear air bombs B-61 in warehouses in Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey and Germany remain. These bombs are intended for delivery by strike fighters of the U.S. Air Force of the F-16 type, and also planes of the countries of NATO.

The situation with safety of the Russian Federation also is aggravated now with plans of expansion of the European segment of the global AMD of the USA.

Thus, in modern conditions the operating system of agreements on safety in Europe does not carry out the mission, lost the former military-political meaning and demands revision.

Current situation already made necessary taking measures to stay of action CCAE by the Russian Federation. The relevant decision was accepted Russia in 2007. Stay of action CCAE by Russia is means of fight of Russia for verification regime updating over arms in Europe.

From the point of view of interests of national security of the Russian Federation the verification regime over the arms, considering a number of related issues of safety in Europe - rockets of average and smaller range, not strategic nuclear weapon of the USA in Europe, usual armed forces, the EUROAMD should become fair.

5. Possible negative consequences for Russia’s denunciation of the Contract on RASR

As it was shown above, for Russia there are motives for the decision on a withdrawal from a treaty about RASR caused by need of acceptance of additional measures for ensuring of own safety in changed after signing of this contract conditions.

Meanwhile such steps can lead to a number of serious negative consequences. Therefore all pluses and minuses of such decision should be carefully counted.

Among negative consequences of denunciation by Russia Contracts on RASR discussed in the expert environment, it should be noted the following:

- expansion in Europe of new American rockets of average range;

- expansion in Europe of additional means of the USA’s AMD (planned on “A stage-by-stage adaptive approach”);

- further strengthening of military capacity of the USA and NATO, increase in their military expenses;

- revision of nuclear policy of Great Britain and France on partial reduction of the nuclear potential;

- possibility for the USA freely to develop high-precision PA of average range;

- further consolidation of the countries of NATO on the anti-Russian platform, strengthening of positions of the USA in NATO;

- negative political and military reaction of others (non-European neighbors of Russia) - China, Iran, Turkey, etc., an aggravation of contradictions of Russia with them;

- negative influence on international legal system in the field of control over arms and non-proliferation;

- image losses of Russia in the world community as advocate of ideas of disarmament.

A number of these consequences have military and technical character, a row - the political and diplomatic character, some lie in the psychological plane.

The main danger of denunciation of the Contract on RASR to Russia consists that it can be a reason for expansion in Europe of the American rockets of average range. This danger is real and essential. As a result we can return to a situation from which at the price of big concessions left by the conclusion of the Contract on RASR.

The USA actually already has rockets of average range in the form of targets for test of AMD systems, and to turn them into means of war will not demand big work and time.

As it is represented, new members of NATO without special problems will agree to provide the territory for the American rockets. It is possible to judge it how it occurs to expansion of the American AMD in Europe.

Thus if in the year 1980 the American rockets of average range of "Pershing-2" (developed in Belgium, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands and Germany) hardly reached the centre of the European part of the USSR, now in case of placement of similar systems in the territory of new members of NATO (Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, the Baltic States) will be blocked all European territory of Russia.

It really would threaten objects of the state and military management of the Russian Federation and the Russian potential of strategic nuclear control.

Taking into account technological development it is possible to expect expansion in Europe not only of ballistic and cruise missiles of average range, but also of shock pilotless aircraft (which, from the point of view of terms of the Contract on RASR also treat cruise missiles). According to V. Dvorkin, “at full transparency of battlefield at the expense of space and other investigation and when using shock pilotless aircraft it is possible to provide rather high vulnerability of a wide range of strategic objects”.

Other possible negative consequences of a possible exit of Russia mentioned above from the Contract on RASR, as it is represented, influence more emotions.

So, for example, NATO and as never after the completion of cold war “rallied on the anti-Russian front” in connection with events in Ukraine. To it testify the atmosphere and solutions of the last summit of NATO which has passed in the beginning of September, 2014 in Newport.

It is hardly necessary to expect a revision of the nuclear policy of Great Britain and France. These countries partially reduced the nuclear potential, but these actions were caused considerably by economic motives which and are actual now. The same reasons will influence policy of military expenses of the USA and NATO.

Reaction of other neighbors of Russia to cancellation of the Contract on RASR in many respects will depend not so much on the fact of denunciation of this agreement, and how many from real possibilities, plans and the subsequent actions for creation and expansion of missile systems of land basing of average and smaller range (quantity, areas of placement, nuclear or non-nuclear fighting equipment, etc.).

Russia will keep a mode of the Contract RASR or will not keep, but those countries which will consider it for itself necessary, all the same will develop the rockets, without meaning a factor of threats of the Russian Federation as meaning. Hardly they will apprehend such step of Russia as threat of own safety and will direct a part of the nuclear missile funds for the Russian Federation.

According to S. Brezkun, “fears are decided that emergence of RAR in us will provoke allegedly China. In total just the opposite - if we had near the Urals and Baikal RAR … that respect of China, Japan and others to Russia only would increase. Where-where, and in the East executed to behavioral politeness really appreciate only force”.

As to development of pilotless aircraft as it is represented, Russia itself it is interested in development of the relevant systems and overcoming of a ban on them in the Contract on RASR.

Now, as to impact of denunciation of the Contract on RASR on the international legal monitoring system over arms and non-proliferation.

According to supporters of saving of the Contract on RASR denunciation of this agreement by Russia “will transfer arrows as on the main opponent of idea of nuclear disarmament popular in the world”, “will even more loosen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty” to Moscow, “will be unequivocally understood as return to confrontation and race of arms between great powers”. In their opinion, the international public perceives the Contract on RASR as the sign phenomenon - a symbol of the final stage of cold war and transition to real nuclear disarmament.

It is necessary to recognize however that the international legal monitoring system over arms and so to be in a certain crisis. Stopped existence the Contract AMD after an exit from it in 2002 of the United States. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty did not come into force, as was not ratified by a number of the countries (including the same United States). The long time is in the deadlock a situation at Conference on disarmament in Geneva therefore negotiations on the Contract on prohibition of production of being split materials for the nuclear weapon and to the Contract on prevention of placement of the weapon in space are blocked. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty so did not receive universal character, out of this mode remain a number of the nuclear countries - India, Pakistan, Israel, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

Certainly problems of the international legal monitoring system over arms and non-proliferation - not an occasion to "finish" it. Such system is certainly necessary for safer and stable world. However such system not is something stiffened, it constantly is in change. After all contracts should serve safety strengthening and if it does not occur, they should change.

It is necessary to notice also that the reason of many problems of control over arms is the policy of a number of the countries and military blocks, and first of all the USA and NATO, on use of force for settlement of the international problems, including plans on use in these purposes of the nuclear weapon or the SOA in non-nuclear equipment. The policy similar to those which was shown by NATO countries in Yugoslavia and in the Middle East, remains a serious obstacle on a way of ideas of disarmament.

It is necessary to remind also that the United States in 2002 unilaterally left the Contract on the AMD of 1972 which admitted "cornerstone" of system of contracts on nuclear disarmament.

In the become widely known Valdai speech on October 24, 2014 the President of Russia, speaking about destruction of operating system of contracts on restrictions and control over arms emphasized that “the beginning to this dangerous process was put by the USA when in 2002 unilaterally left the contract on the AMD. I pay your attention - not we began it!”

It is necessary to remind also that Russia urged to discuss the possibility of giving the Contract on RASR a global character. Let's consider this possibility of preservation of a verification regime over RASR in more detail.

6. Solution: Global Contract on RASR

 In 2007 Russia put forward an initiative about giving to the Contract on RASR of global character. This idea was supported by Washington that allowed to prepare and extend at the 62nd session of General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007 the Joint Russian-American statement under the Contract on elimination of rockets of average range and smaller range.

In this statement the appeal “sounded to discuss possibility of giving of global character to this important mode by refusal of ballistic and cruise missiles of land basing with ranges of 500-5500 kilometers, conducting to destruction of any such rockets and the termination of the related programs”.

In 2008 Russia prepared “Basic elements of the international legal arrangement on elimination of rockets of average range and smaller range (land basing), open for wide international accession”.

Main provisions of this document are as follows:

- any participating state of the arrangement does not make any rockets of average range and smaller range, does not carry out flight tests of such rockets and does not make any steps of such rockets and any launchers of such rockets;

- each participating state of the arrangement liquidates all the rockets of average range and smaller range, launchers of such rockets, and also connected with such rockets and launchers all auxiliary constructions and all auxiliaries which are in its property or possession or which are placed in any place under its jurisdiction or control.

It is curious that a bit later with an initiative of the global Contract on RASR the president of France of that time Nicolas Sarkozy acted.

Certainly, creation and the subsequent realization of a mode of the global Contract on RASR would bring mass of positive results.

The world would get rid of rockets in a range of ranges from 500 km to 5500 km, in summary - further improvement of a situation on a global scale and safer world.

It would become a powerful positive contribution to strengthening of a mode of nuclear non-proliferation. Well-known that the most effective remedy for delivery of nuclear ammunition are rockets. Their absence essentially would reduce motivation to creation of the nuclear weapon. It would be an all-important contribution of other states to process of nuclear disarmament.

The arrangement on a complete elimination of RASR practically would remove from the agenda a question of the need of the AMD to fight against such rockets, after all they are available for the countries, “causing concern”.

The result of the realization of this idea would be not only to strengthen international and national security, but also to rid the participants in the future contract of the economic burden connected with the creation, production and expansion of the considered classes of weapons.

However it is necessary to recognize that the realization of the RASR global mode is hardly possible as a foreseeable prospect. And the countries possessing ballistic RASR also do not wish to be connected to the Contract on RASR.

On the one hand, for many countries, such a missile system is viewed as important (and sometimes, the main thing and the only thing) and the most effective remedy of ensuring their own safety and control of regional conflicts (an example - Indian-Pakistan relations). So, the realization is on the rise, politically, at the regional and global levels.

On the other hand, the promotion of an initiative of the global contract on RASR does not make a guarantee of safety to the states which do not possess – or have refused –  rocket means. The contract does not contain in it any instructions on the encouragement of such countries. It is clear, that the states having rocket weapons spent huge material and financial means for their creation, and the question of possible compensation in default from rockets is not designated.

At last, the question is essentially important, whether the initiative means involvement of all states without exception, or whether it allows the possibility of a future invitation to the contract of only some states.

The idea of the elimination of two classes of weapons bears in itself a positive beginning. For its advance it is necessary to discuss conditions and principles on the basis of which the arrangement on the elimination of rockets of average and smaller range should be developed. Here it is important to consider, at least, the following:

- recognition of inadmissibility of power methods of the permission of political affairs, and the threat of force is necessary;

- it is necessary to be defined, whether the arrangement is to be general, or some states cannot be participants, or subsequently they can join;

- the arrangement should assume a term-less character;

- the arrangement should provide a realization of phased implementation in rather long terms (all at once);

- the achievement of the arrangement on the preliminary announcement of the missile stocks of all states in RASR available for them could become an important point on a way of transfer of an initiative to the practical plane;

- in the arrangement guarantees of ensuring national security for all the participants (otherwise to count on success it is not necessary) should be surely fixed;

- along with guarantees of safety it is important to fulfil and fix measures of encouragement of the states which have refused possession by rocket means. For example, there could be a speech about preferential terms for them in implementation of a conclusion of payloads to space by means of carrier rockets of other states or assistance in the creation of carrier rockets by them.

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