Geopolitical significance of the Battle of Molodi and the Special Military Operation

In the days from 9 July to 2 August 2022, the 450th anniversary of the victory of the Russian army in the battle of Molodi occurs. In its meaning, this battle is comparable to the battle for Moscow in the Great Patriotic War. At least that's how the greatest contemporary specialist of the Russian Middle Ages, the historian Dmitry Volodikhin, considers it. As in 1941, in 1572 the very existence and geopolitical future of the Russian state was at stake. Now in the Special Military Operation in Ukraine, the stakes are just as high.

Prologue to Eurasian power

Russia, starting from the era of Ivan III, has confirmed its status as a great Eurasian power. Already under the grandfather of Ivan the Terrible, Moscow not only united the north-east and north-west of Russia, but also began a long dispute with Lithuania over other lands that were considered the heritage of the Rurikovichs. In addition, the Russian regiments went to Kazan and Siberia, securing another legacy in Moscow - the legacy of Genghis Khan. The lands of the Tatar khanates and their vassals began to enter the orbit of Moscow's influence.

Russian Eurasian historian Georgy Vernadsky called the period from 1452 to 1696 the period of the victory of the forest over the steppe. Then the Russian state, strengthened in its historical core - the influence of the Oka and the Volga - began to move south and east, where it achieved the greatest territorial gains. During these two and a half centuries, the initiative to control the vast expanses of Eurasia passed from the nomads and their state formations to Russia and the Russians. However, in this struggle, Russia had to endure a lot.

The main enemy of the Russians in the south for many centuries was a fragment of the Golden Horde - the Crimean Khanate. Its territory included not only modern Crimea, but also the northern Tavria and the Sea of Azov. These are the lands where bloody battles are taking place, the Kherson region and the Donbass. The coincidence is not accidental. Russia, forced to respond to the threat from Crimea, gradually moved south and in the 18th century obtained the annexation of these once desert spaces and began their agricultural and industrial development. The Wild Field and the space of the Tartar nomads became Novorussia, which was inhabited by immigrants from the regions of the empire of Great Russia and Little Russia, as well as foreigners: Serbs, Wallachians, Moldovans, Greeks. After entering the independent state of Ukraine in 1991, the people who lived here retained their Russian imperial identity, being, if not literally, culturally the descendants of those who conquered and developed this region for the whole of Russia.

However, there would be no Novorussia if the Russian troops had not been defeated in 1572 by the Crimean troops 50 miles from Moscow.

Historical context

In 1572, Russia was in a state of long war with the West - the Livonian War. The main military forces were concentrated in the fight against the Commonwealth and Sweden. At this time, the Crimean Khanate and its patron - the Ottoman Empire - decided to take revenge for the loss of Kazan and Astrakhan. The accession of these Tatar khanates to Russia in 1552 and 1556 respectively and their loss of independence were the result of a geopolitical confrontation with the Crimea and the Ottomans, who sought to establish their proteges there. At the same time, Moscow was supported by other Tatars of Eurasian orientation, for example that of Kasimov. Even a part of the Nogai began to reorient themselves towards Moscow, after in 1557 the Bey of the Nogai Horde, Bek-Bulat, recognized himself as a vassal of Ivan the Terrible. In 1561 Ivan the Terrible married Kuchenya (Mary in baptism), daughter of the influential Kabardian prince Temryuk. Russia received a strong ally in the Caucasus, together with which it began to develop the Sundzha and Terek valleys. In 1570, the Tsar sent a letter of praise to the Don Cossacks.

It was also a hot area of the current special military operation. In 1556, the Tsarist army and the Cossacks waged a campaign against the Crimea. The enemy was destroyed in Azov. Ochakov, the Kalmius River, Seversky Donets - the geography of the then Cossack campaigns and the sallies of the royal governors - coincide with the geography of the Special Military Operation.

It was possible to stop the process of strengthening Russia in the steppe, relying on the Tartar and Circassian allies and the Cossacks, waiting for it to lock on another front. This is exactly what happened when Moscow in 1558 was involved in the long and difficult Livonian War, which destroyed all the forces of the State. In 1569-1570, the Crimea and the Turks unsuccessfully attempted to take Astrakhan, after which they decided to strike Russia straight in the heart.

In 1571, the troops of the Khan of Crimea Devlet Giray took and burned Moscow, which put Russia on the brink of disaster, the king was already ready to negotiate the abandonment of Kazan and Astrakhan. The following year, the Crimea and the High Gate intended to deal a fatal blow to the Russians.

The geopolitical consequences of a hypothetical Crimean victory would at least be the loss of Russian control over Kazan and Astrakhan. Russia could no longer expand south and east. Nothing good would have come from the West for the Russians if Moscow collapsed under the blows of the South. Instead of a continental Eurasian power, Russia would be a small Eastern European state if her neighbors allowed her to remain independent. Weak and defeated Russia would become prey, and her inhabitants would remain defenseless against the threat of raids from the south, leading the population to the Crimean slave markets. Moscow's mission as Third Rome, which the Russians had just accomplished, would have remained unsatisfied. Russia would be eliminated on take-off.

The sense of Molodi's victory

In 1572, the heroism of the troops of the princes of the zemstvo voivode Mikhail Vorotynsky and the oprichny voivode Dmitry Khvorostinin, the military skill of these commanders and the good will of God did not allow this scenario to occur. The Crimean army, more numerous than the Russians, reinforced by the Nogai and Circassians, as well as by the Turkish Janissaries, was completely defeated near the village of Molodi, not far from the modern city of Chekhov. 20 thousand Russian soldiers defeated the Turkish army which numbered from 60 thousand people (according to modern historians) to 120 thousand (according to the annals).

The result of the Russian victory was the survival of Russia and the cessation of the Crimean raids for 20 years, the Crimean Khanate suffered significant manpower losses. Crimea and Turkey no longer claimed the return of the possessions of the former Golden Horde. In 1577, the capital of the Nogai Horde, Saraichik, was taken by the Russians. In 1581, the Yermak campaign ushered in the era of the conquest and development of Siberia.

Eventually, the former Crimean Khanate also became an integral part of the Empire. Russia conquered the entire northern region of the Black Sea from the Ottomans in Odessa and Izmail, the geopolitical landmarks of the current armed conflict on the territory of the failed State, whose name recalls another dimension of the battle of Molodi.

The frontiers of geopolitics

In the 16th century, the "Ukrainian (ie border) lands" of the Russian State began in the distant suburbs - beyond the Oka, whose left bank was the first line of defense and contact with the steppe. On the eve of the battle of Molodi, the Russian army tried to stop the Crimean armies at the Oka. But it failed.

Although the Muscovite state under Grozny pursued a policy of great power, claiming a significant role in Europe and Asia, its capital was extremely vulnerable to an external enemy. This factor played a role in the further advancement of the notch line, a system of guard fortifications that were supposed to hold back the enemy, who constantly reminded himself.

The notch line under Grozny moved south on the Novgorod-Seversky - Orel - Novosil - Dankov - Ryazhsk - Shatsk - Radom - Temnikov - Alatyr line. The threat made it necessary to constantly move the carving line south, to build new fortresses in the Wild Field until the creation of the Belgorod and Izyumskaya carving lines in the 17th century (another reminder of the geography of the Special Military Operation). These lands also became the object of popular colonization. Russia has grown. The wild field became the Russian field.

The special military operation that Russia has been conducting in Ukraine since February is also largely caused by a similar threat. The configuration of Russia's southwestern borders, as 450 years ago, carries the same danger: an instant attack (now with the latest weapons) right in the heart: Moscow. And it must be resolved in Ukraine itself, whose name itself means "border" in the same way - by moving the border - the line of contact with the existential enemy (now it is the West and NATO) to the southwest. The Russian border, the "Ukrainian lands", must constantly move, which has been happening since 2014, step by step. Reclaiming the former Wildfield space is a Russian geopolitical imperative, a testament to ancestors who once faced a similar challenge.

Political aspects

The battle of Molodi can serve not only as an example of heroism and military art, but also as an example of self-sacrifice. There are also political aspects that are relevant to this day.

The Russians demonstrated unity at the time not just of a division, but of the country's legal division into two parts: the "zemshchina" and the "oprichnina". However, the enemy was stopped together - the oprichnina and zemstvo forces. Another lesson from the Battle of Molodi, which is still relevant in the days of the Northern Military District, is that diplomacy is useless in a confrontation with an enemy who intends to destroy you. What would happen if Grozny gave Kazan and Astrakhan to the Crimean "partners"? Fortunately for Russia, instead of diplomacy, they chose the path of war and lost.

It is now important that Russia remembers the battle of Molodi as one of the most important battles in the history of the homeland. In this battle, Russia defended its historic mission at a time when it was already aware of it, but it was still quite fragile. Everything could have changed. Now the Russian state is in a similar historical situation: Russia has begun geopolitical expansion towards the former Wildfield, but is still as vulnerable as it was 450 years ago, when the 1991 catastrophe actually brought us down. The enemy still hopes to take revenge, the fight will be difficult and not without problems. However, relying on the experience of their ancestors, inspired by their example and courage, the Russians will win, as they did then.

Translated by Alessandro Napoli