The death of democracy and the birth of social-conservatism

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world has been living under the hegemony of philosophical, political, cultural, and economic liberalism. An imperial oligarchic unequal system, which advances behind the mask of mass democracy. But the discourse of the ruling class and the Western media can no longer hide the reality of this dictatorship without borders or faces.

In the West, and particularly in the European Union, the people’s vote, when it is not in line with the oligarchical agenda, is openly rejected or delegitimized (the 2005 referendum in France, the Brexit in 2016 and the Trump election the same year). The hyperclass no longer hides its desire to abolish, not the superstition of democracy, but the consideration of the interests of peoples.

Democratic superstition

Democracy is associated, in the collective imagination, with the principle of equality and the idea of political power equally distributed among citizens. However, in ancient Greece, where it was born, democracy was never achieved. From Athens to representative democracies, it has always been constituted by a series of exclusions: slaves, the poor, women, aristocrats…

And today, democracy excludes the people themselves, in its vast majority.

As early as 1895, Gustave Le Bon explained that the meaning of the terms democracy, equality, freedom, etc., have such a vague meaning that large volumes are not enough to specify it. And yet, he said, a truly magical power attaches itself to their brief syllables, as if they contained the solution to all problems. For these words synthesize various unconscious aspirations and the hope of their realization.[1]
It is on this semantic vagueness that Western leaders are playing on.

This magical power, this hope of realization, is linked to the religious dimension. So is the current crisis, which is very often ignored or neglected by political scientists.

Indeed, democracy is, like any political ideology, a form of religion that does not say its name : it lives by and through the faith of peoples.

And it is through democratic voting, a true religious ritual in the new temples, that citizens commune and testify to their consent, to their faith in the regime.

But this faith has been eroded, the hypnotic effect of the „magical” words is dissipating day by day as the democratic chimera moves away and the impoverishment of peoples worsens to the benefit of international finance.
Today, the whole modern political edifice is in danger, because beyond democracy, all the modern ideologies underlying political parties and institutions have died : socialism, liberalism, left, right… are now only hollow words to which only small sections of the population remain traditionally attached.

Conservative liberalism

Nature hating emptiness, this decomposition of modern ideologies and the ensuing populist wave pushed the ruling class to create a false alternative to this threat.

This new political proposal is liberal conservatism. An alliance of two contradictory political philosophies : conservatism and liberalism.
However, this current corresponds to a sociological reality, the objective alliance of the traditional and liberal progressive bourgeoisies. In France, for example, supporters of the Manif pour tous (the Catholic and conservative bourgeoisie that opposed same-sex marriage and homoparenthood), voted overwhelmingly for the pro-LGBT Emmanuel Macron in 2017 (76% in Versailles); and in the same way, the electorate of the left bourgeoisie, verbally opposed to international finance, voted in the second round for the same candidate, this banker stamped Rothschild (52% of the voters of Mélenchon voted for Macron).

In the United States we find the same pattern, progressive democrats and conservative republicans are opposed (with some exceptions) to economic protectionism, which makes it possible to lift the proletarians and the middle classes out of poverty ; but also to save the national economy.

The French philosopher Jean-Claude Michéa sums up the contradiction of the liberal conservatives as follows : « It is difficult to reconcile the idea that Sunday is the Lord’s Day or the day of family activities with the idea that it should be a working day like any other. The economic model aims first and foremost to produce, sell and buy everything that can be produced or sold, whether it is a flat screen, a Kalashnikov or a belly of a mother-carrier. »[2]

For a certain bourgeoisie, attachment to religion is not linked to the positive values that it carries within it and conveys, quite the contrary ; for example: in France, the anti-Catholic 18th century Voltairian bourgeoisie had partially recatholicized itself in the 19th century, not because it had regained faith, but out of fear of social revolution which could jeopardize its interests.[3]

This bourgeoisie, which allied itself in the same period with the cosmopolitans who had worked to develop and spread throughout Europe the liberal doctrine of the philosopher Claude Henri de Rouvroy de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) and who helped to establish the domination of bourgeois capitalism in the 19th century.[4]

This bourgeoisie, which adorns itself with traditional values, is, in practice, more liberal than conservative, more materialistic than religious, and is at the opposite of social Catholicism, which despised money and encouraged among the privileged a sense of responsibility towards the poor.

Moreover, the survival of social disciplines from the teachings of the Church – family stability, local cooperation, anti-individualistic morality – still constitutes protective layers in a neocapitalist society that favours the isolation of individuals, selfishness, mass narcissism and the ideological devaluation of any work that would not instantly generate a gain.[5]
Beyond their speeches, the two bourgeoisies, on the left and the right, are united in protecting their wallets against the national interest, against the people.

Social conservatism to counter conservative liberalism

On the basis of this historical and sociological reality, the alternative to be proposed and defined, logically, is social conservatism, i.e. the coherent combination of traditional values and socio-economic protectionism.

The new divide in all developed countries is based on the same economic and cultural logic as that of territories integrated into economic globalization, namely the large globalized metropolises on the one hand, and small towns, medium-sized industrialized cities and rural areas[6] on the other: where the populist wave comes from, where the majority, composed of the working class, peasants and the middle classes that are suffering from globalization, live.

These are the people Donald Trump spoke to during his election campaign in 2016, and these are the people who made him win.

Western peoples are now ready to hear and respond to a social-conservative discourse, but the focus must still be on what unites the different components of the majority society : socio-economic and cultural protectionism.
For the fact is that Western societies are, for many, so fragmented, due to the disappearance of collective beliefs, that it is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a cohesion similar to that of traditional societies.

Communism and republicanism promised an immediate egalitarian paradise on earth. Having failed to deliver on their promises, communism died, and republicanism is in its final phase of decomposition.

In contrast, Catholicism and Orthodoxy promised, through baptism and works, salvation and eternal bliss in the afterlife, but they also guaranteed social protection on earth.
We must therefore integrate, in a second level of social-conservative discourse, the draft of a constitution based on natural law and divine law (the two coincide), as desired by the fathers of the modern state, the French Jean Bodin (1529-1596) and the English Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), which explained that « the function of the sovereign consists in the purpose for which the sovereign power has been entrusted to him, namely to provide security for the people, to which he is bound by the law of nature, and he is bound to account to God, the author of that law, and to no one else. »[7]

This is what the peoples are demanding today: leaders and laws that provide them with security against the globalist snake.

[1]Gustave Le Bon, La psychologie des foules, 1895, Presses Universitaires de France, 1963, pp. 59-60.

[2]Jean-Claude Michéa, entretien avec Laetitia Strauch-Bonart, « Peut-on être libéral et conservateur ? », Le Figaro, 12 janvier 2017.

[3]Emmanuel Todd, Qui est Charlie ? Sociologie d’une crise religieuse, 2015, Le Seuil, p. 53.

[4]Bernard Lazare, L’antisémitisme son histoire et ses causes, 1895, réédition 2012, Kontre Kulture, p. 131.

[5]Idem,Emmanuel Todd, Qui est Charlie ? Sociologie d’une crise religieuse,p. 118.

[6]Christophe Guilluy, No Society, La fin de la classe moyenne occidentale, 2018, Flammarion, pp. 27-28.

[7]Thomas Hobbes, Le Leviathan, chapitre XXX : De la fonction du Représentant souverain, 1651.

Source - FLUX