Analysis of early fighting in World War I, 108 years ago, Part 4

At the latter end of August 1914, in the face of German Army victories and advances, the Franco-British forces were in retreat all along the front west of the city of Verdun, which is located 140 miles east of Paris.

 

On 20 August 1914, the German 1st Army (Alexander von Kluck) had captured the undefended Belgian capital city, Brussels. Belgium's position was extremely difficult and most of the Belgian Army, in spite of displaying staunch resistance against the Germans, was compelled to retire to Antwerp in northern Belgium. By 24 August, with the French and British having suffered defeats at Dinant and Mons in southern Belgium, the Western allies were in the process of withdrawing southward from Belgian soil towards the vital Paris region. 

 

The German war strategy called the Schlieffen Plan looked at this stage to be running smoothly. One key reason, for the German progress of August 1914 and Western allied losses, was due to the gross French military errors and miscalculations; such as the French Army having launched ill-advised attacks, from 7 August, into the former French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine close to the border of Switzerland, and also in the Ardennes forest area. All of this conformed perfectly to what was laid out in Germany's Schlieffen Plan. 

 

The Battle of the Ardennes alone, between 21–23 August, resulted in 42,557 casualties for the French 3rd Army (Pierre Ruffey) and French 4th Army (Langle de Cary), in opposition to the German 4th Army (Albrecht Duke of Württemberg) and German 5th Army (Crown Prince Wilhelm), with the Germans incurring 14,940 casualties. The fighting in the Ardennes saw 27,000 French soldiers killed in the course of a few hours on 22 August. This black day of the French Army had damaged its morale. Further losses would lead to the remarkable mass mutinies of 1917, which permanently weakened the French Armed Forces as was starkly revealed in 1940. 

 

In August 1914, French military intelligence had succeeded in underestimating German manpower strength in the West by hundreds of thousands of men. The French Army high command also felt its soldiers alone could defeat the German Army, but there was no logic to back up such a belief. The French were soundly beaten in the 6 months which comprised the Franco-Prussian War, ending in January 1871. In the more than 4 decades since, the gap between the Germans and French had widened, as Germany's industrial strength and growing population left France trailing behind. The French military leader Charles de Gaulle said, “Our decline dates back to the war between Napoleon and the Russians”. (in 1812) 

 

With the aid of England and especially Russia in 1914, the French had a real fighting chance against Germany. This was looking less likely as August 1914 was reaching its end. The French offensives in Alsace-Lorraine and the Ardennes had been a fiasco. The French Army leader, General Joseph Joffre, had failed previously to discern that the main weight of Germany's advance would fall elsewhere; as the German right wing was marching to the west of the Meuse river, through Belgium and into northern France. General Joffre realised this was definitely the case around 26 August, too late, when he cancelled the Ardennes attack on that date. 

 

The same day, 26 August, the British Expeditionary Force (John French), which had no choice but to withdraw from southern Belgium, fought a delaying action in the far north of France at Le Cateau. On 29 August, the French 5th Army (Charles Lanrezac) tried to stop the Germans at Guise, 100 miles north of Paris. Both of these Anglo-French efforts failed, though they did temporarily halt the march of the German right wing. At Guise, the German 2nd Army (Karl von Bülow) was stalled for 36 hours through to 30 August, while it had to wait in any case for the German 1st Army and German 3rd Army (Max Klemens von Hausen) to come up. Each hour of delay in the West meant that the Russian Army was advancing closer in the East. 

 

On 31 August 1914, the Raymond Poincaré government fled Paris in some panic and moved to Bordeaux, taking with them the gold bullion from the central bank. At this point, it must have appeared to many observers that the Western allies were in serious difficulty. However, the French 2nd Army (Edouard de Castelnau) still controlled the Grand Couronné heights above Nancy, Lorraine's largest city. The French 2nd Army was, furthermore, able to send troops westward towards the Paris area, while the French 3rd Army, with its new commander Maurice Sarrail who replaced Ruffey, continued holding on to Verdun. 

 

Under the Schlieffen Plan, as envisaged by its renowned creator Alfred Graf von Schlieffen, his successor as the German Army leader, Helmuth von Moltke, should have been allowing the French 2nd and 3rd armies to advance further into the trap; thereby committing themselves to an area which contained little strategic importance close to Switzerland, and was held by the weaker German left wing; which was holding a line between the city of Metz over 100 miles south to the Swiss border. The decisive fighting meanwhile was taking place further west, where the German right wing was sweeping down on the Paris region. 

 

That General von Moltke had not allowed the German left wing to fall back, and entice deeper into the net the French 2nd and 3rd armies, reveals that he failed to grasp the strategic concept set forth by Field Marshal von Schlieffen, concerning the German left wing. Now General von Moltke was to show that he also misunderstood the strategic concept regarding the German right wing. Von Schlieffen had outlined that the right wing – which consisted of the majority of German Army divisions – would pass through Belgium, the southern Netherlands and northern France, cross the Seine river just above Rouen in the Normandy region, sweep around Paris to the west and south, and smash the French Army against the Swiss frontier like a sledgehammer striking an anvil. 

 

At the head of the right wing was the German 1st Army, which was designated to advance 40 miles west of Paris; and then, in a vast enveloping manoeuvre, to wheel back inward in an eastwardly direction, only when the German 1st Army had progressed well to the south of Paris. On 31 August, the very day the French government fled Paris, a definite departure from the Schlieffen Plan occurred when von Moltke granted the 1st Army commander, Alexander von Kluck, permission to shorten his march and wheel inward directly to the north of Paris, with the aim of finding the French flank and driving it east from Paris; rather than, again, performing such a move after advancing to the west and south of the French capital, as von Schlieffen had foreseen. 

 

General von Moltke decided to abandon the very essence of the Schlieffen Plan, the giant outflanking manoeuvre, in favour of a frontal attack on Paris. As a consequence von Moltke ordered that they drive forward in the centre, while the German 1st Army, which was to have been the hammerhead of the assault, was relegated to the role of flank guard. What was worse than this, was that for every mile the German 1st Army advanced prematurely south-eastward, the risk grew that it, which had intended to be the outflanker, would itself be outflanked by the French soldiers amassing around Paris. General von Moltke had already weakened the German right wing, by sending 2 corps to surround Antwerp, where the Belgian Army sought refuge. Then on 26 August, he dispatched a further 2 German corps to East Prussia, to help guard against the Russian Army's approach. 

 

On 3 September 1914, the Franco-British command finally became aware of the change in direction of the German 1st Army. The Western allies knew that the German 1st army was marching diagonally across the face of Paris, with its flank exposed to a potential French counterattack from the capital. This was not clear to the civilian population of Paris most of whom, by late August and early September, were afflicted by a feeling of unease. There was a belief that the German Army was going to roll into the centre of Paris. If Paris was taken, the Germans would still have to destroy the remaining Franco-British forces in the field, and then march east to fight the Russian divisions. 

 

At the beginning of September, some protesters in Paris demanded that the capital be declared an “open city”, in order to spare the famous metropolis and its treasures. In the war's opening weeks, according to historical analyst Christopher Klein, “Sporadic air raids hit the city [Paris] at night, resulting in damage more psychological than physical, but on September 2 a German biplane carpet-bombed the city with propaganda leaflets that read, 'There is nothing you can do but surrender'.” 

 

Tens of thousands of Parisians were cramming into train stations, a last-ditch attempt to flee the city before the Germans arrived. Staff at the Louvre art museum in Paris shifted its masterpiece paintings to Toulouse, in the south of France. The governor of Paris, General Joseph-Simon Gallieni, forecast that the Germans would enter the capital by 5 September 1914, if nothing was done to stop them. In late August, the German right wing was within 100 miles of Paris. As the Western allies quickly retreated across the front, the Germans in following days moved closer and closer to Paris. 

 

By 3 September, the German right wing was about 20 miles from Paris as the crow flies, having reached the commune of Meaux to the north-east of the French capital, after they successfully forced a crossing of the Marne river. The German 1st Army, in its diagonal advance to the north of Paris, then advanced to within 15 miles of the capital. Yet in early September, the reality is that the German armies were in a state of some confusion. General von Moltke had made critical strategic alterations to the Schlieffen Plan, which disrupted the flow of the German progress. In addition, the long marches were placing strain on Germany's supply systems. 

 

The fatal flaw in Field Marshal von Schlieffen's war strategy, was that the Germans did not have the required number of troops in the West, with which to defeat the French and British within the allotted 6 weeks, while always wary of the advancing Russian Army in the East. This manpower shortage was merely overcome partly, by the German use of reserve units at the outset of the campaign. The probability remains that the odds were simply too great in this war for Germany to prevail against Russia, England and France. 

 

The French implemented steps to restore the situation when, at 10 pm on 4 September, General Joffre issued orders for a general counterattack to be launched on 6 September; in the hope that the German 1st Army, and part of the German 2nd Army, would be crushed between converging assaults. General Joffre's decision to counterattack may have come after relenting to the pressure applied on him by General Gallieni, the military chief of Paris. Gallieni had warned Joffre that the Germans would advance in force west of the Meuse river, through Belgium and northern France, but his advice was ignored. 

 

That September of 1914, the French plan of counterattack looked promising on the maps. As it was, the Franco-British counterattack proceeded in slow motion. The Germans were by now aware of the coming Allied counterstroke, and they abandoned the attempt to capture Paris. This was a difficult, but correct decision, which allowed Germany to regroup and save its armies. On 6 September, the day that the First Battle of the Marne officially began, 3 corps from the German 1st Army recrossed the Marne river, in order to remove the possibility of encirclement and destruction. Due to the Franco-British sluggishness, the Germans got back across the Marne completely unmolested. 

 

By 6 September, a considerable gap was emerging between the German 1st and 2nd armies. The puncture in the German frontline was partially covered by some cavalry, and other light infantry units called Jäger battalions. On 7 September, the British Army (the British Expeditionary Force now consisted of 3 corps) and the French 5th Army marched northward. 

 

Military historian Lt. Col. Donald J. Goodspeed wrote that the Anglo-French troops again “moved with exasperating slowness and caution, though there was almost nothing in front of them. By last light, the British had pressed ahead only to within 4 or 5 miles of the Marne; Franchet d'Esperey's 5th Army [Lanrezac was replaced] had not advanced quite so far. For a brief time, there had been a chance to cut off and destroy the German 1st Army, but between September 7 and 9 this chance disappeared. The British had advanced only about 8 miles a day and the French 5th Army rather less. The Germans would lose the war on the Marne, but they were to be spared a tactical defeat”. 

 

Germany was faced with the nightmare war on two fronts. General von Moltke's shortcomings undoubtedly contributed quite a lot to the Schlieffen Plan's failure. In 1911, von Moltke had let slip his lack of belief in the Schlieffen Plan, and that he felt a continental war would likely be a long one. That year von Moltke wrote of the Schlieffen Plan, “It will be very important to have in Holland a country whose neutrality allows us to have imports and supplies. She must be the windpipe that enables us to breathe”. 

 

Note the words “imports and supplies” which are necessary in an extended conflict only, nor does a country need a “windpipe that enables us to breathe” in a short war. Supporting his above comments, von Moltke chose not to send German troops into Dutch territory in 1914, because he did not wish to offend the neutral Netherlands. Von Schlieffen, on the other hand, had wanted a brief war which he believed Germany could win. On that basis, von Schlieffen designated a German invasion of the Netherlands in the event of war erupting. 

 

Had the Schlieffen Plan succeeded in 1914, or were the Germans to be defeated that year, it is unlikely that demagogues would have emerged to the extent they later did – such as in Italy with Benito Mussolini and in Germany with Adolf Hitler. Instead, 4 years of continental war created the sorts of societal conditions in the West which made possible fascist autocrats gaining power. 

 

In the meantime, by 9 September 1914 the German right wing remained in a precarious position close to Paris, while the German left wing was at a standstill in north-eastern France. With the situation beside the Marne especially hazardous, the beleaguered General von Moltke sent his chief of intelligence, Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Hentsch, to visit the various German army headquarters by staff car, with the authority to order a retirement if necessary. At the headquarters of the German 3th, 4th and 5th armies Hentsch found everything in order; but with the German 2nd Army Hentsch perceived that its commander, Karl von Bülow, was badly on edge. It was agreed between Hentsch and von Bülow, if the British and French crossed the Marne river in force, that the German 2nd Army should retire to the north. 

 

By 7:30 am on 9 September, the British managed to get portions of its I Corps and II Corps across the Marne; but for some strange reason, once the British traversed the river they then halted at 11 am, and did not resume their advance until late afternoon. The progress of the French 5th Army was slow too. Regardless, because of the untenable German position beside the Marne, when Lieutenant-Colonel Hentsch arrived at German 1st Army headquarters, he ordered it to withdraw in agreement with its commander General von Kluck. 

 

At dusk on 9 September the German 1st and 2nd armies, and the western half of the German 3rd Army, were falling back towards the Vesle and Aisne rivers, located approximately 80 and 90 miles respectively north-east of Paris. By now, the British were a mere 6 or 7 miles north of the Marne, while the French had still not crossed the river. 

 

Despite this, the remainder of the German 3rd Army had to conform to the retreat of the other German forces over the Marne. On 11 September, von Moltke ordered the German 4th and 5th armies to also retire. Goodspeed wrote, “The Marne was far from being a tactical victory for the Allies. Yet the Marne was the great battle of the war, the decisive turning point... The great German plan had failed, and now Germany was faced with exactly that two-front war of attrition that her military leaders had always recognized she could not win”. 

 

On 12 September, the day in which the Marne battle finished, the German 1st and 2nd armies were across the Aisne river comfortably clear of the French capital, having hardly been pursued at all by the Franco-British forces. Rather than defending the vulnerable Aisne river line, the German 1st and 2nd armies chose commanding defensive positions on the higher ground, 2 miles north of the Aisne. The German front in the West was established the following day, 13 September, and would remain so for the next 4 years. When Franco-British attacks on 13 and 14 September failed to break through the German positions, both sides began to entrench. 

 

 

 

Christopher Klein, “The First Battle of the Marne”, History.com, Original publication 5 September 2014, Updated 31 August 2018

 

Holger H. Herwig, The Marne, 1914: The Opening of World War I and the Battle That Changed the World (Random House Inc., 1 Dec. 2009) 

 

Pierre de Gaulle, “Ukraine, Trapped In A Spiral Of War”, Geopolitica, 5 July 2022

 

Vejas G. Liulevicius, “Military Tactics of WWI: The Failure of the Schlieffen Plan”, Wondriumdaily.com, 1 December 2017

 

Encyclopaedia Britannica, “First Battle of the Marne, World War I [1914]”, Britannica.com, 30 August 2022

 

Michael Duffy, “The Battle of Le Cateau, 1914”, FirstWorldWar.com, 22 August 2009

 

Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Volume 29, Issue 3 

 

Donald J. Goodspeed, The German Wars (Random House Value Publishing, 2nd edition, 3 April 1985) 

 

Kennedy Hickman, “World War I: Battle of Charleroi”, Thoughtco.com, 7 December 2017