Analysis of early fighting in World War I, 108 years ago, Part 3

The really decisive fighting in the First World War occurred during the first few weeks of the conflict having broken out. The war's outcome rested on the success or failure of the German Empire's Schlieffen Plan, named after its principal strategist Alfred Graf von Schlieffen.

Yet Field Marshal von Schlieffen, at age 72, had retired in December 1905 as the German Army's commander-in-chief (Chief of the German General Staff). His successor was General Helmuth von Moltke, a less capable soldier. Von Moltke had only accepted the post reluctantly, after Kaiser Wilhelm II insisted that he wanted him because of the famous Moltke name. His uncle Helmuth von Moltke the Elder was a well regarded 19th century field marshal. The younger Moltke would still be commander-in-chief when war erupted in the summer of 1914.

The Schlieffen Plan called for a powerful and rapid advance of the German Army westward – mostly through Belgium and northern France – resulting in the planned destruction of the Belgian, French and British forces within the allotted 6 weeks; having accomplished that the German divisions, as outlined by the Schlieffen Plan, would then march eastwards to engage the Russian Army; which by September 1914 would be at Germany's eastern borders.

If the Schlieffen Plan's first critical stage was to fail, in other words should the Germans be unable to swiftly eliminate the Western allies, the implications of a war on two fronts were obvious, at least to Berlin's military command. The German Army generals were painfully aware their troops would be unlikely to win the dreaded two-front war, against some of the world's strongest and most heavily populated countries.

As it turned out, the Schlieffen Plan was running almost exactly on schedule in its early phase following the German invasion of neutral Belgium, launched on the morning of 4 August 1914. The invention of the giant siege howitzer (Big Bertha) by Germany's armament firm, the Krupp steel company, was crucial to the German conquest of the fortress city of Liège in eastern Belgium. Liège's 19th century forts were reduced to rubble by Big Bertha's shells, with Liège falling on 16 August 1914.

This opened the way for the German armies to progress at relative ease into the heartland of Belgium, a mostly defenceless country and smaller than Switzerland. Beyond Liège, much of Belgium's terrain was empty of Belgian troops and devoid of defensive fortifications. German mobilisation of all of its forces was completed on 13 August 1914. Two days before Liège collapsed, on 14 August the vitally important right wing, consisting of the bulk of the German Army, started entering Belgium. Leading the right wing was the German 1st Army, commanded by General Alexander von Kluck, and the German 2nd Army led by General Karl von Bülow; these two armies comprised of 12 corps amounting to almost 600,000 soldiers.

The German 1st and 2nd armies had the furthest to go, which is why they moved first out of the right wing; the German 1st and 2nd armies were tasked with advancing south-westwards through Belgium, entering northern France, wheeling back around the “gigantic fortress” of Paris, surrounding and taking the French capital city with a detachment of 6 or 7 German corps; thereafter moving south of Paris to destroy the French Army in a vast enveloping manoeuvre, similar to Hannibal’s encircling movement and victory against the Romans at Cannae, in the year 216 BC.

To the rear and left of the German 1st and 2nd armies was the German 3rd Army (General Max Klemens von Hausen), the German 4th Army (Duke Albrecht of Württemberg) and the German 5th Army (Crown Prince Wilhelm). These latter armies, of the German right wing, were each requested to advance more slowly than the 1st and 2nd armies. The march south-westwards, through Belgium and towards the Paris region, was not to begin until the German 1st Army captured Brussels, the Belgian capital city, located in central Belgium.

On 17 August 1914, the Belgian government fled Brussels. Three days later, the German 1st Army reached Brussels and captured the undefended and open city. By now, 20 August, the greater part of Belgium's army had retired to the north of the country, where it found refuge in the city of Antwerp. Also on 20 August the German 3rd Army, following a few failed attempts, established a crossing over the Meuse river at the city of Dinant in southern Belgium.

After 10 days of fighting, the German 3rd Army defeated the French forces in the Battle of Dinant, which concluded on 24 August 1914. With Dinant secured, the German 3rd Army was positioned 150 miles from Paris as the crow flies. By 25 August, a feeling of unease was permeating through Paris and much of northern France. Less than 20 miles north of Dinant, the city of Namur fell on 25 August and the roads through Belgium were at the Germans' mercy.

Already on 23 August 1914, a Sunday, the German 1st Army was bearing down on the city of Mons, in western Belgium, less than 140 miles north of Paris. Beside Mons was stationed the French 5th Army (General Charles Lanrezac) and the British Expeditionary Force (Field Marshal John French). On the morning of 23 August, many of the Belgian locals in Mons and the outlying villages went to church as usual, oblivious to the approaching German 1st Army.

The Germans reached Mons on the mid-morning of 23 August, breaking the deceptive tranquillity. The German 1st Army commander, General von Kluck, unwisely chose in his initial assault on Mons to pursue a head-on battle against the British Expeditionary Force, rather than to outflank the British and possibly force them to surrender or retreat.

The British commander, John French, was pleased with how the opening skirmishes had gone, as the Germans suffered considerable casualties in their frontal attacks in Mons; but, due to continually poor intelligence conducted by France's military, Field Marshal French was not privy to the sheer numbers of the enemy that opposed him, which exceeded the many tens of thousands of troops, and not merely the thousands which he presumed.

General Lanrezac leading the French 5th Army was already fearing the worst. His senses rightly told him there were enormous German forces before them, and that the main weight of the enemy's assault was falling in his region of influence. On the night of 23 August 1914, hours after the German attack against Mons had begun, Lanrezac sent out orders that his army will retreat southwards from the Mons region to northern France, in order to avoid the threat of encirclement.

As would occur in 1940, resentment was emerging between the French and British in 1914. Military author Lt. Col. Donald J. Goodspeed wrote, “What Sir John French could not take into account was that Lanrezac would retreat from his positions that night [of 23–24 August], without troubling to inform the British on his left until a short time before the retirement. When the British learned at midnight that the French were pulling out in an hour or two, they had no choice but to do the same. Nor did Sir John French desire to stay any longer. He was utterly disgusted with Lanrezac's behavior, and felt that he had been badly let down by his ally”.

When Field Marshal French arrived at Lanrezac's headquarters the day before, 22 August, he quickly perceived the French disarray. He was informed by Lanrezac that, on 21 August, the French 5th Army had lost to the Germans the crossings of the Sambre river, which flows through southern Belgium and northern France. This was grave news. The French had suffered approximately 30,000 casualties in the Battle of the Sambre, or Battle of Charleroi as it is more commonly known, as opposed to about 11,000 German casualties.

Field Marshal French had wanted to stay in Mons and continue the fight; but now, with General Lanrezac retreating, the British commander announced that he intended to withdraw to Saint Nazaire in western France, on the Atlantic coast, where the Royal Navy was stationed. Field Marshal French's reaction was somewhat over-the-top and Lord Kitchener, the British Secretary of State for War, was greatly disturbed to hear of his commander's action, as were the British cabinet. In person, Lord Kitchener informed Field Marshal French of the importance of maintaining good relations with France's hierarchy, and to conform with “the movements of the French Army”.

The British Expeditionary Force had landed in France as recently as 16 August 1914. The reality is that the French were architects of their own troubles. From the outset of France's military campaign on 7 August 1914, their offensives were directed into their former provinces, Alsace and Lorraine, located beside Switzerland and which held no possible strategic importance. At the behest of the commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre, around 30% of the French Army's entire manpower strength was committed to the Alsace-Lorraine area, which that August of 1914 ended in German victories and threatened the total defeat of France. The German Army high command had, for years, counted on the French at the outbreak of war entering Alsace-Lorraine, a region which the Germans had incorporated to the Reich in 1871.

Even worse, slightly further north of Alsace-Lorraine the French initiated another ill-fated attack in the Ardennes forest area, along the frontier of France and Belgium, terrain ideally suited to the German defenders. The Battle of the Ardennes saw German troops inflict over 40,000 casualties against the French 3rd and 4th armies, in the space of just a couple of days (21–23 August 1914).

As August 1914 was reaching its latter stages, the Allied retreat continued all along the front west of Verdun, a city in north-eastern France located 140 miles east of Paris. The British Expeditionary Force fell back from Mons to French soil. On 26 August, the British II Corps from the Expeditionary Force held its ground and fought at the commune of Le Cateau, in the far north of France, 110 miles from Paris. The Battle of Le Cateau, which concluded on the same day it started, resulted in a convincing German victory on paper. It saw the British II Corps suffer 7,812 casualties, more than twice that of the enemy. At Le Cateau, the Germans made effective use of their artillery from concealed positions against the British troops.

Three days later, on 29 August, Lanrezac's French 5th Army fought a delaying action against von Bülow's German 2nd Army, at the city of Guise, a mere 100 miles north of Paris. The Germans prevailed over less than 2 days of heavy fighting; still, the engagement around Guise stalled the German 2nd Army's advance through to 30 August. Yet the Germans were clearly edging towards the Paris region.

At the end of August 1914, the unease which had gripped Paris was descending to panic in some quarters. On 31 August, the Raymond Poincaré government ingloriously departed the French capital, and moved over 300 miles southward to Bordeaux. They presumably chose Bordeaux because of its position beside the Atlantic, where they would be able to escape France by vessel if the country was defeated by Germany.

Notes

Dr. John Rickard, “Battle of the Sambre or Charleroi, 21–23 August 1914”, HistoryOfWar.org, 15 August 2007

Michael Duffy, “The Battle of Le Cateau, 1914”, FirstWorldWar.com, 22 August 2009

Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College, Volume 29, Issue 3

Donald J. Goodspeed, The German Wars (Random House Value Publishing, 2nd edition, 3 April 1985)
Elizabeth Vlossak, “Alsace-Lorraine”,1914-1918-online International Encyclopedia of the First World War, 21 October 1916

Kennedy Hickman, “World War I: Battle of Charleroi”, Thoughtco.com, 7 December 2017