The Saudi-Qatar tensions: real reasons

The current crisis is a continuation of the "war of words" that broke out between Saudi Arabia and its allies and Qatar immediately after the visit of US President Donald Trump to Riyadh on May 20-21, 2017. Just after return from the capital of the Saudi Kingdom, which hosted the Arab and Muslim Summit, and a meeting with the heads of state of the Council of Cooperation of the Arab States of the Persian Gulf, the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, delivered a speech to the graduates of the military school. He de facto criticized the current position of the US, opposed the isolation of Iran, announced that most likely Donald Trump will soon step down as president of the United States, and therefore should there is no real reasons to bet on him, voiced significant disagreements between Qatar and the United States and implied that there was the presence of a threat from neighboring states, alluding to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Later, after Qatar's official media disseminated this information, a stiff reaction was received from other Persian Gulf states and Egypt. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain turned off access to the Internet pages of the Qatari media, including Al Jazeera TV, and the media controlled by the Saudi and the UAE launched an information war against the Qatari leadership. Qatar officially disavowed reports of its media, declaring a hacker attack, but Riyadh and the allies continued the information campaign against Doha, claiming that Al Tani's controversial statements, whether they had a seat or not, reflect Qatar's unacceptable position on a number of issues.

In general, the differences between Qatar and Saudi Arabia reflect the struggle of these monarchies of the Gulf for influence in the Middle East. The countries are cooperating in Yemen and Syria, but they confront each other in Egypt, where they support two opposing sides of a smoldering civil conflict, and Libya, where Doha stands for the Islamists of Tripoli, and Riyadh for General Haftar. At the same time, Qatar has not changed its policy significantly before. A sharp change in attitude towards Qatar indicates a narrowing of the fields, where this country and Saudi Arabia cooperate. In Yemen, their anti-Hussein coalition is de facto broken, and the stake of war is no longer a matter of victory, but of a worthy withdrawal from the military campaign. In Syria, both states are de facto excluded from the partition of this country on spheres of influence, where on one hand the trio of Russia, Iran and Turkey decide the fate of the north, and the pro-American and pro-Israeli Kurds act also in this region, and in the south the pro-Saudi and pro-Qatari groupings find it increasingly difficult to demonstrate subjectivity in the context of the US , Great Britain, Jordan and Iran struggle for the Baghdad-Damascus highway and the at-Tanf crossing. At the same time, these same factors open a window of opportunity for a temporary alliance between Doha and Tehran against Riyadh. Therefore, Qatar can easily afford to secretly support Iran against its rival, the Saudis. The Shiites are a serious problem for Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, but not for Qatar, where they are almost none, and therefore the Iranian use of the Shiite factor in the struggle against Saudi Arabia and its Bahraini satellite is not dangerous for Qatar.